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THREATS MADE, THREATS POSED 
SCHOOL AND JUDICIAL ANALYSIS IN NEED OF 
REDIRECTION 
Sarah E. Redfield* 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the tragic school shootings that traumatized the 
nation, we have become consumed by a need to adequately 
address school violence. Schools have a role here and so do 
courts. Part 1 of this article reviews the context of increasing 
attention to threatening or violent speech in schools. 1 Part 2 
reconsiders the classic Supreme Court cases on student speech 
and threatening speech within this context. Part 3 reviews 
subsequent civil and criminal case law from state supreme 
courts and lower federal courts. Against this legal background, 
Part 4 considers the current FBI and Department of Education 
research on school threat assessment, and relates this research 
to judicial opinion on threatening speech. 
In Part 5, the article concludes that the current response to 
threatening speech in schools not only lacks cohesion, but also 
unnecessarily neglects relevant research that could be useful. 
Recent court cases suggest that the courts are largely out of 
touch with the real needs of threat assessment and of the 
schools' necessary response to stop violence. Specifically, the 
* Professor Redfield is on the faculty at Pierce Law Center in Concord, NH 
where she founded the Education Law Institute. She can be reached by email at 
sredfield@maine.rr.com. 
1. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines threat as "an expression of 
intent to do harm or act out violently against someone or something." Threats can be 
spoken, acted, or symbolic; direct, indirect, veiled or conditional. Mary Ellen O'Toole, 
The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment Perspective 6, 7 (Critical Incident Response 
Group, Nat!. Ctr. for the Analysis of Violent Crime, & FBI Acad.) (available' at 
<http://www.fbi.gov/publications/school/school2.pdf>) (accessed ,June 5, 2002). This 
definition obviously differs from those used by the courts in defining a true threat, or 
the various threatening behaviors proscribed by statute. See discussion infra. at Part 4. 
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courts fail to recognize the vital difference between a threat 
made and a threat posed. The factors that arise from school 
violence are complex and multifaceted, and judicial and school 
concerns in this area are not coterminous. This disparity of 
interests inhibits the real world application of threat 
assessment, and suggests the need for a jurisprudential 
approach-like the approach the courts have taken with the 
Fourth Amendment in school search cases-that is unique to 
schools. In response to this problem, the article suggests a 
matrix for analysis and a credible, defensible response to school 
threats, an approach that is consistent, but not equivalent to 
current jurisprudence. 
PART 1. THE CONTEXT 
Americans like to think of our schools as safe havens for our 
children. Yet, as a nation, we have been stunned by 
extraordinary occurrences of targeted violence in our schools, 2 
Grayson, Bethel, Pearl, Paducah, Edinboro, Springfield, 
Jonesboro, and Columbine.3 There is also evidence of less 
targeted, but nevertheless significant, daily violence 4 and fear 
of violence in our schools. 5 In 1999, for example, twelve to 
2. Targeted violence is that violence where the perpetrator has pre-selected a 
particular target. Experts recommend specific techniques for dealing with such 
targeted violence. Marisa Reddy et a!., Evaluating Risk for Targeted Violence in. 
Schools: Comparing Risk Assessment, Threat Assessment and Other Approaches, 38 
Psycho!. in the Schs. 157 (2001) (available at <http://www.ustreas.gov/usss/ 
ntac/ntac_threat_postpress.pdf>) (accessed Jan. 25, 2003). 
3. Daniel E. Della-Giustina, Scott E. Kerr, & Dawn L. Georgevich, Terrorism & 
Violence in. our Schools, 45 Prof. Safety 16 (Mar. 2000) (available at 
<http://www.asse.org/psmar.pdf>) (accessed Jan. 25, 2003). There were thirty-seven 
school shooting incidents between December 1974 and May 2000. Bryan Vossekuil et 
al., The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: implications for the 
Prevention of School Attacks in the United States ii, 3 & Appendix A (U.S. Secret Serv. 
& U.S. Dept. of Educ. May 2002) (available at <http://www.secretservice.gov/ 
usss/ntac/ssi_final_report.pdf>) (accessed May 27, 2003). See also Patrick Richard 
McKinney II, Student Author, On The School Board's Hit List: Community Involvement 
in Protecting the First and Fourth Amendment Rights of Public School Students, 52 
Hastings L .• J. 1323 nn. 96-103 (2001). 
4. See Phillip Kaufman et al., Indicators of School Crime and Safety, 2001 (U.S. 
Dept. of Educ. & U.S. Dept. of ,Justice Oct. 2001) (available at 
<http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2002/crime2001/l.asp>) (accessed ,Jan. 25, 2003); see generally 
McKinney, supra n. 3. 
5. One example is presented by Santana High School outside San Diego. A 1997 
survey on bullying there showed "50 percent of Santana's students said they did not 
feel safe while on campus, 35 percent had been a victim of verbal abuse, and 12 percent 
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eighteen year old students were victims of 2.5 million crimes at 
school, 6 including 186,000 serious crimes of rape, robbery, and 
sexual and aggravated assault. 7 From the period of July 1998 
through June 1999, there were forty-seven violent deaths.8 
Additionally, some 3,500 students were expelled from school for 
carrying guns and other types of firearms. 9 The percentage of 
high school students who reported that they were "threatened 
or injured with a weapon on school property" has remained a 
steady 7 to 8 percent.10 Even more students are harassed and 
bullied.U Data shows that 16.9 percent of students have been 
bullied on more than a single occasion, 12 and five percent, or 
1.1 million students, stay out of certain areas of their school. 13 
The recent spate of school shootings has caused serious 
reflection and study searching for the precursors of violent 
behavior. One clear finding from this research gives significant 
context to the discussion of threatening speech: there are often 
had been physically threatened." The lethal shooting of two students and wounding of 
thirteen took place at Santana in 2001. Miriam Hernandez & Karla Davis, Grabbing 
Bullying by the Horns, abcncws.com (Mar. 19, 2001) <http://abcnews.go.com/ 
sections/US/DailyNews/bullying010319.html> (accessed July 2001). 
6. Kaufman eta!., supra. n. 4. 
7. fd. 
8. ld. 
9. Beth Sinclair et a!., Report on State Implementation of the Gun Free Schools 
Act School Year( sf 1995-1999 (U.S. Dept. of Educ. Oct. 2000) (available at 
<http://www.ed.gov/pubs/gunfree.partl.html>) (last accessed Jan. 20, 2003). 
10. Vossekuil, supra. n. 4, at 6. These deaths included thirty-eight homicides, six 
suicides, two killed by police, and one accident. Kaufman, eta!., supra n. 4. 
11. An American Association of University Women Survey reported, "85 percent 
of the girls and 76 percent of the boys surveyed have experienced sexual harassment." 
Am. Assoc. ofU. Women Educ. Found., Hostile Hallways: The .AAUW Survey on Sexual 
Harassment m America's Schools (1993) (available at 
<http://www.aauw.org/2000/hh.html>) (accessed Jan. 25, 2003). A review of sexual 
harassment and its particular part in school violence is generally beyond the scope of 
this article. See generally Davis v. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999). In a similar 
story, the Associated Press reported: "Amid growing concern over school violence, a 
nationwide study has found that bullying affects nearly one of every three U.S. 
children in sixth through tenth grades. Young students and boys were most likely to be 
affected." Linsey Tanner, AP Newswires, Survey Shows Bullying Widespread Among 
Students (Apr. 25, 2001) (available at Westlaw AP Newswires 00:00:00). See also Rose 
Arce, Study: Kids Rate Bullying and Teasing as "Big Problem," 
<www.cnn.com/2001/US/03/08/violence.survey/index.html> (accessed Jan. 25, 2003). 
12. Mark Anderson et al., School Associated Violent Deaths 1994-1999, J. of the 
Am. Med. Assn. 2098 (Dec. 5, 2001). See also U.S. Dept. of Educ. & U.S. Dept. of 
,Justice, 1.998 Annual Report on School Safety (Oct. 1998) 
<http://www.ed.gov/PDFDocs/schoolsafety.pdf> (accessed Jan. 25, 2003) (increase in 
fear of violence at school); McKinney, snpra. n. 3. 
1:~. Kaufman eta!., supra. n. 4. 
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clues (though not necessarily directed threats) that precede the 
violence. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has reported 
that key among the things that schools can do to enhance 
safety is "watching for signals that precede violent outbursts, 
paying close attention to threats, and learning to recognize and 
respond to bullying behavior."14 According to the CDC, over 
half of the incidents of violence that they studied followed a 
danger-signal such as "a threat, note or journal entry ."15 This 
was particularly true regarding suicide. 16 
One school shooter, for example, wrote a series of suicidal 
and homicidal poems prior to the attack: 
Am I insane 
To want to end this pain 
To want to end my life 
14. Violent students were "nearly seven times as likely as victims to have 
expressed some form of suicidal behavior (thoughts, plans or attempts)." Anderson, 
snpra n. 12. See also Amanda Bower, Scorecard of Hatred, Time Mag. (Mar. 19, 2001); 
Edward Gaughan et a!., Lethal Violence at School 
<http://www .alfred.edu/teenviolence/shootings.html> (accessed Jan. 25, 2003); 
Bu.llying, Tormenting O(t.en Led to Revenge in Cases Studr:ed, Chi. Sun Times (Oct. lfi, 
2000) (available at <http://www.suntimes.com/shoot/case15.html>) (accessed July 1, 
2001). 
15. The recent shooting by a nursing student in Arizona offers continuing 
illustration of this. See e.g. David J. Cieslak, Shooter Well-Armed, Had Made Threat, 
Tucson Citizen lA (Oct. 29, 2002). 
16. The suicide cases offer another line of analysis beyond the general scope of 
this article. These cases are obviously relevant for their views on threatening harm to 
one's self. Many are negligence claims brought against the schools, typically for failure 
to warn. Some of them raise speech issues directly, e.g. Brooks u. Logan, 903 P.2d 73 
(Idaho 1995) (when a student writes something threatening in her journal); Grant u. 
Bd. of Trustees, G76 N.E.2d 705, 706 (Ill. App. 1997) (tells other students he is going to 
kill himself); McMahon u. St. Croix Falls Sch. Dist., 596 N.W.2d 875 (Wis. App. 1999); 
Eisel u. Bd. of Educ., 597 A.2d 447 (Md. 1991) (tells a counselor or physician he is going 
to kill himself); Armijo u. Wagon Mound Pub. Sch., 159 F.3d 1253 (lOth Cir. 1998); 
Hoeffner u. The Citadel, 429 S.E.2d 190 (S.C. 1993). See also e.g. Maxine Bernstein, 
Killer's Anger Described Through His Own Words, The Oregonian, (Nov. 3, 1999) 
(available at <www.oregonline.com/news/99/ll/st II 0303.html>) (accessed ,July 1, 
2002). The National Household Survey on Drug Abuse reports that in 2000, 
approximately three million young people considered suicide, of which thirty-seven 
percent actually attempted suicide. While early identification is the primary course of 
prevention, only thirty-six percent received any mental health treatment, and those 
were mostly from school counselors, school psychologists, and teachers. Natl. 
Household Survey on Drug Abuse, Substance Use and the Risk of Su.icide Among 
Youths, The NHSDA Report (U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs. July 12, 2002) 
(available at <http://www.samhsa.gov/oas/2k2/suicide/suicide.htm>) (accessed Jan. 15, 
2003). 
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By using a sharp knife 
Am I insane 
Thinking life is profane 
Knowing life is useless 
Cause my emotions are a mess 
Am I insane 
Thinking I've nothing to gain 
Considering suicide 
Cause love has died 
Am I insane 
Wanting to spill blood like rain 
Sending them all to Hell 
From humanity I've fell. 
667 
The teacher in this instance recommended that the student 
get help, but he never received it. The student attempted 
suicide, and then killed two adults at school saying he "hoped 
to be convicted of capital murder and executed by the state."17 
Another student wrote: 
"Murder" 
It's my first murder 
I'm at the point of no return 
I look at his body on the floor 
Killing a bastard that deserves to die 
Ain't nuthin' like it in the world 
But he sure did bleed a lot. 18 
17. Robert A. Fein et al., Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing 
ThrealeninK Sil.nutions and to Creating Safe School Climates (U.S. Secret Serv. & U.S. 
Dept. of Educ. May 2002) (available at <http://www.ustreas.gov/usss/ntac/ 
ssi~guide.pdf>) (accessed Jan. 25, 2003). See also Bower, supra n. 14 (Catholic suicidal 
student wanting to be killed by the police). 
Ill. Yonth's Poems, Cincinnati Post, Web Ed. (Nov. 10, 1998) 
<http://www.cincypost.com/news/ 1998/write 111098.html> (accessed ,Jan. 15, 20o:n. 
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In this case, the student's English teacher did not tell a 
counselor or an administrator about the composition. This 
student author had also told a friend that it would be cool to go 
on a killing spree just like the lead characters in the movie 
"Natural Born Killers." The student, Barry Loukaitis, 
subsequently shot two students and a teacher at Frontier 
Middle School in Moses Lake, Washington.19 One of the 
students was Manuel Vela Jr. who was apparently shot "in 
retaliation for months of [calling Loukaitis a] 'faggot."'20 
The clues are there in these poems and other writings. 21 
The results in these instances graphically illustrate the need to 
understand the line between speech and threats, not only in 
legal and constitutional terms, but also in practical terms, so 
that we can protect schools and help disturbed students. We 
need to develop an ability, somehow, to distinguish between 
speech that constitutes a serious threat, and speech that is 
merely a cause for concern. An example of the need to 
distinguish between these kinds of speech is illustrated by the 
difference between the elementary student who draws a crude 
picture including a gun and blood,22 and the high school 
student who threatens to shoot up the school if his English 
teacher doesn't give him a hug.23 
19. Kevin ,Jennings, Be A Man, The Advocate (Sept. 29, 1998) (available at 
<http://www .advocate.com/htmllstories/0599A/0599_kjennings.asp>) (accessed Jan. 15, 
2003). 
20. /d. 
21. See Katie Kerwin McCrimmon, No Guarantee Children Won't Face Tragedy, 
.Jeffco School Chief Says, Rocky Mtn. News (Denver, Colo.) 5A (Apr. 28, 2001) (Dylan 
Klebold's teacher had met with Dylan's parents and counselor about a violent essay he 
had written about a trench-coated killer); Kate Barlow, Parents, Schools Need to Read 
Signals of Yo nth Violence, The Hamilton Spectator A 14 (Feb. 10, 2001). 
22. See Commonwealth u. Milo M., 7 40 N .E.2d 967 (Mass. 200 I) (discussed infra 
n. 125); Barbara F. Berenson, Supreme Judicial Court Holds That Student's Drawings 
Constitute Criminal Threat, Mass. Atty. Gen. Safe Schs. Newsltr. 9 (Jan. 2001) 
(<available at <http://www.ago.state.ma.us/pubs/ssnOlOlw.pdf>) (accessed Jan. 25, 
200;{). 
2a. St. u. McCooey, 802 A.2d 1216 (N.H. 2002). In McCooey, high school senior, 
,John McCooey, said he might shoot up the school if his teacher did not give him a hug. 
The teacher said that she thought the statement was sarcastic, but reported it to the 
guidance counselor. Two police officers were called to the school to investigate the 
possible threat and interviewed the teacher, the principal, and the school resource 
officer. A search of John McCooey's house found no weapons, but John was arrested 
and charged with disorderly conduct, for which he was convicted in district court. The 
New Hampshire Supreme Court decided the case on the basis of insufficiency of the 
evidence without reaching the First Amendment claims. 
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[n the instances of the poems and the violence they 
foreshadowed, adults knew about the threats. 24 Adults and 
fellow students, however, may be unable to distinguish 
between serious threats and joking remarks. The difference 
between serious frustration that might lead to violence, and the 
general run of human frustration,25 may not always be clear. 
While adults often face this dilemma, it is actually other 
students who most often know that a threat has been posed.26 
For example, Evan Ramsey, the killer of two in Alaska, told 
two friends about his plans. 27 Evan now wishes that they had 
told others instead of encouraging him. From prison, he said 
that telling someone about his plans "would have been one of 
the best things a person could have done."28 For students, the 
inability to distinguish a real threat from jest or frustration is 
augmented by their reluctance to "rat" on or report friends. As 
a result, both students and adults fail to make reports and take 
appropriate steps to intervene before a troubled student acts 
out. 
21. See e.g. Suspect Had Talked about Shooting at School, CNN.com (Mar. 5, 
200 I) (Santana shootings) <http://www .cnn.com/200 11US/03/05/school.shooting.07/> 
(accessed Jan. 15, 2003); Stndents Say Snspect Warned of Plan to Shoot Up School, 
.Jefferson City News Trib., Online Ed. (Mar. 6, 2001) <www.newstribune.com 
/stories/030601/wor_0306010037.asp> (accessed Jan. 15, 2003). 
25. F'or example, the Louisiana Supreme Court recently considered a student's 
claim that his words were in jest. St. ex rel. RT, 781 S.2d 1239, 1242 (La. 2001) 
(discussed infra at n. 105). The Court noted the violent climate in schools, analogized 
to the airplane bomb-threat cases, but ultimately found that rationale unpersuasive. 
The Court put it this way: "It is regrettable that RT answered JW's question about a 
potential bombing as he did. It might be true, as he testified at trial, that he made the 
statement at issue because he was frustrated at having been asked all day long about 
whether he was going to blow up the school. Indeed, the trial judge may well have 
taken that into consideration in specifYing that he serve his sentence in a non-secure 
setting. However, with the climate of fear already surrounding the school, and with 
RT's knowledge that people were especially in fear of him, it was particularly bad 
judgment to falsely confirm that he intended to blow up the school. It does not become 
more acceptable to yell 'fire' in a crowded theater because the offender does it out of 
anger, frustration, or because he has a bad day at the hands of others. The state has a 
legitimate interest in prohibiting false bomb threats." Id. at 1247. See also ,Jones v. 
St., 64 S.W.3d 728, 734 (Ark. 2002) (discussed infra at n. 221); In the Interests of 
C.C.JI., 651 N.W.2d 702 (S.D. 2002). 
26. See e.g. Bower, supra n. 14. 
27. "I told everyone what I was going to do," Ramsey is quoted as saying. Bill 
Dedman, Deadly T.essons School Shooters Tell Why, Chi. Sun Times (Oct. 16, 2000) 
(available at <http://www.suntimes.com/shoot/case15.html>) (accessed Jan. 20, 2003). 
See also .James Barron, Terror in Littleton: The Words; Warnings Signs From A 
Student Turned Killer, N.Y. Times (May 1, 1999); Thomas J. Lueck, [Three} Slain at 
Law School; Student is Held, N.Y. Times (Jan. 17, 2002). 
28. Timothy Roche, Young Voices from the Cell, Time Mag. (May 28, 2001). 
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Because the perpetrators of school violence often do talk 
about their plans, and often do threaten to engage in violence, 
a school's response is literally vital. School officials must 
respond to threats and reports of threats appropriately; it is 
crucial that they "have a fair, thoughtful, and effective system 
to respond to whatever information students do bring 
forward."29 However, the formulation of effective responses 
that are within the constraints of the Free Speech clause 
remains an issue. As the Ninth Circuit remarked in a recent 
case concerning a student's poetry: 
Although schools are being asked to do more to prevent 
violence, the Constitution sets limits as to how far they 
can go. Just as the Constitution does not allow the 
police to imprison all suspicious characters, schools 
cannot expel students just because they are "loners," 
wear black and play video games.3° 
The justices who dissented from a denial of a request for 
reconsideration in this case cast the issue much more strongly: 
After today, members of the black trench coat clique in 
high schools in the western United States will have to 
hide their art work. They have lost their free speech 
rights. If a teacher, administrator, or student finds 
their art disturbing, they can be punished, even though 
they say nothing disruptive, defamatory or indecent and 
do not intend to threaten or harm anyone. School 
officials may now subordinate students' freedom of 
expression to a policy of making high schools cozy 
places, like day care centers, where no one may be made 
uncomfortable by the knowledge that others have dark 
thoughts, and all the art is of hearts and smiley faces. 
The court has adopted a new doctrine in First 
Amendment law, that high school students may be 
29. See e.g. O'Toole, supra n. 1. See also Jon Marcus, Student's Warning to 
Favorite Teacher Foils Gun and Bomb Plot, The N.Y. Times Educ. Supp. 26 (Dec. 14, 
2001) (New Bedford Columbine-like plot); Bower, supra. n. 14; but see Goldwire u. 
Clark, 507 S.E.2d 209, 209 (Ga. App. 1998) (teacher just shrugged off student's 
warning of bomb threat). See also 20 U.S.C. § 7138 (b)(2)(2002). 
30. LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2001), reconsideration 
en bane denied, 279 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 2002 U.S. LEX IS 4948 
(2002). ln making this observation the Ninth Circuit cites to Kevin Fagan, Life Harder 
for Teen Outcasts: For Some Bay Area Kids, Times Are Tougher Since Littleton, S.F. 
Chron., Al (May 7, 1999). See also RT, 781 S.2d 1239 (student fits black trench coat 
stereotype); In re McCoy, 742 N.E.2d 247, 248 (Ohio App. 2d Dist. 2000) (see discussion 
infra. n. 31). 
663] THREATS MADE, THREATS POSED 671 
punished for non-threatening speech that 
administrators believe may indicate that the speaker is 
emotionally disturbed and therefore dangerous. 31 
The dispute articulated within the Ninth Circuit opinion 
encapsulates the issue: somewhere along the spectrum of 
violence and the First Amendment, schools must draw the line 
defining speech that will be disciplined; and states must draw 
the line defining speech that will be prosecuted criminally. 
Often, neither line encompasses adequate threat assessment or 
response to a troubled student. Use of such an approach that is 
grounded in threat assessment research could avoid the kind of 
litigation that led to the Ninth Circuit split and could also help 
to define the parameters of constitutional analysis in this area. 
This article will look next at the Supreme Court's student and 
threatening speech jurisprudence, and at an illustrative set of 
state Supreme Court and lower federal court cases in this 
context. It will then continue with the FBI's currently 
recommended threat protocol, followed by a review of current 
case law in this context. Finally, it will examine a new 
paradigm for analysis that would incorporate threat 
:ll. LaVine, 279 F.3d at 720-721 (Kleinfeld & Kozinski, ,JJ., dissenting). In 
support of this view of the post-Columbine judicial mentality regarding black-trench-
coat stereotype concerns, see In re McCoy, 742 N.E.2d at 248-249. Well before 
Columbine, Dawn McCoy, a talented artist, had developed a character she called NigeL 
Nigel wore a black trench coat. Dawn had rendered him as a ceramic figurine and as a 
comic book character. When Xenia High School students constructed a large sympathy 
card to send to Columbine, Dawn drew Nigel on the Columbine card with a peace sign. 
When asked by school officials to remove the drawing from the Columbine card, Dawn 
did so. School officials also asked Dawn not to display her figurine. Although she 
agreed to this, she continued to show Nigel until it was confiscated the next day by the 
vice principal. In art class later that day, Dawn told friends that she was upset that 
the vice principal had taken Nigel away and "she wanted to wear a trench coat that 
had bombs in it *** and kill the faculty." When her classmates asked if she were 
serious, Dawn first said she was tired, then said nothing, then said maybe. Dawn's 
classmates reported that she appeared "angry and frustrated" and did not appear to be 
joking. When questioned by the vice principal, Dawn denied that she made the 
statements. The vice principal asked her to stay home the next day, which she did. 
According to school administrators, there was an "air of panic" in the school and, by the 
end of the week, some 300 students were absent. Dawn was adjudicated as delinquent 
on a charge of inducing panic, and was fined $75. In her defense, Dawn asserted that 
the panic was caused by other threats at the school and by the strong presence of police 
officers. On appeal, the Ohio court ruled that the evidence, that she told a classmate 
she would consider wearing a trench coat with bombs, was sufficient to meet the 
statutory requirements, and that her statement was a significant contribution to the 
state of panic at the school, making it inconsequential that it was admittedly one of 
several events that induced the panic at the schooL !d. See also Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 
2917.31 (A)(2) (West 2000). 
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assessment into the current protocol for school and judicial 
review. 
PART2. THESUPREMECOURTONSTUDENTSPEECH 
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech .. .'':32 Like the 
speech of ordinary citizens, student speech has First 
Amendment protection: 
First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment, are available 
to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that 
either students or teachers shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable 
holding of this Court for almost 50 years.33 
The contours of First Amendment speech protection in 
schools have been laid out in a set of three Supreme Court 
cases that are often referred to as "the trilogy:" Tinker v. Des 
Moines Community School District, from which this quote is 
taken, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, :l4 and 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. 35 These three cases, 
all of which involved speech that took place on school premises, 
have been the guidepost for student speech analysis since they 
were decided (in 1969, 1986, and 1988, respectively). 36 While 
32. U.S. Const. amend. L The prohibitions of the First Amendment are 
applicable to the states. See e.g. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49-50 (1985). 
33. Tinker v. Des Moines Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
34. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
35. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
36. Compare Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979) (underground 
newspaper published and distributed off premises not subject to school discipline: "our 
willingness to defer to the schoolmaster's expertise in administering school discipline, 
rests, in large measure, upon the supposition that the arm of authority does not reach 
beyond the schoolhouse gate"); Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1141 (D. Me. 1986) 
(student who gave teacher "the finger" in restaurant parking lot away from school and 
school hours entitled to First Amendment protection as against suspension tor 
violation of school rule against "vulgar or extremely inappropriate language or conduct 
directed to a staff member") with Donovan v. Ritchie, 68 F.3d 14, 15 (1st Cir. 1995) 
("shit list" developed off-premises and delivered at school subject to school discipline); 
Pangle v. Bend-Lapine Sch. Dist., 10 P.3d 275 (Or. App. 2000), review denied, 34 P_;{d 
1176 (Or. 2001) (off premises newspaper revealing school personnel names, addresses 
and the like and offering advice on poison, viruses, and other harmful activities, not 
protected by the First Amendment). The article in Outside!, which underlies the Pangle 
opinion is included in the Appendix. See generally Perry Zirkel, Disciplining Students 
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the trilogy's fact patterns are far from today's school 
environments, the precedent applies to new facts in new 
places.37 
In Tinker, three students participated in a planned protest 
against the Vietnam War. The protest involved wearing black 
armbands on specified dates in December. With advanced 
know ledge of the planned protest, the area principals adopted a 
policy under which any student wearing an armband would be 
asked to remove it. If they did not do so, the student would be 
suspended until he or she returned to school without the 
armband.38 On December 16th, John Tinker and Christopher 
Eckhardt, fifteen and sixteen-year-old high school students, 
and John's sister, Mary Beth, a thirteen-year-old junior high 
student, wore black armbands to school and were suspended. 
They returned to school after the New Year, which was the end 
of the planned protest period. 39 In a civil rights suit brought 
against the Des Moines Independent Community School 
District, its school board, administrative officials and teachers, 
the students sought nominal damages and injunctive relief. 40 
At trial, the students testified that although they had known of 
the school policy, they had nevertheless worn the armbands to 
mourn for the Vietnam dead and to support the call from 
Senator Kennedy for the extension of the Christmas cease-
fire_41 The district court dismissed the students' complaint, 
finding that the school's actions were constitutional. The 
Eighth Circuit, sitting en bane, was evenly divided, thus 
leaving the opinion of the district court in force. 42 The 
Supreme Court, however, reversed, noting that "the wearing of 
armbands in the circumstances of this case was entirely 
divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct by 
those participating in [the protest]. It was closely akin to 'pure 
speech,' which, we have repeatedly held, is entitled to 
for Off-Campus Misconduct: Ten Tips, 163 Educ. L. Rep. 2 (2002); Robert E. Simpson, 
Jr., Limits on Students' Speech in the Internet Age, 105 Dick. L. Rev. lill, 1!30 (2001). 
:n. See generally Clay Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On Campus Punishment: 
Censorship of the Emerging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 243 (2001). 
:~R. Tinker. 39:~ U.S. at 504. 
39. ld. 
10. Tinker v. Des Moines Community Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa 
1966). 
41. Jd. at 972. 
42. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505. 
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comprehensive protection under the First Amendment."4:1 The 
Court went on to find that there was "no evidence whatever" 
that the students' speech interfered with the school or with 
other students. 44 
Expressly rejecting the district court's finding that the 
school action was justified because it was based on fear of 
disruption, the Supreme Court said, "undifferentiated fear or 
apprehension of disturbance"45 is simply "not enough to 
overcome the right to freedom of expression.'' 46 Recognizing 
that while departure from the norm may readily cause fear or 
trouble, the Court weighed more heavily the free speech 
concerns, concluding that "we must take this risk" because "our 
history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom-this kind 
of openness-that is the basis of our national strength and of 
the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live 
in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society."47 
Against this history and standard, the Supreme Court 
established a benchmark of substantiality: 
In order for the State in the person of school officials to 
justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, 
it must be able to show that its action was caused by 
something more than a mere desire to avoid the 
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany 
an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly where there is no 
finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden 
conduct would 'materially and substantially interfere 
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the 
operation of the school,' the prohibition cannot be 
sustained. 48 
This has become the grounding point for Constitutional 
analysis of school speech: whether or not the speech was 
actually or potentially, materially and substantially disruptive 
to the work of the school, and whether or not it interfered with 
the rights of other students.49 
4:l. ld. at 50f>-506. 
H. !d. at 508. 
·15. !d. 
16. !d. 
47. !d. at 508~509. 
48. /d. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, :36:3 F.2d at 749). 
49. But see Erwin Chemerinsky, 2000 Constitutional L. Sympo~ium, Students Do 
/,eave Their First Amendment Rights at the Schoolhouse Gates: What's Left of Tinker? 
48 Drake L. Rev. 527, 528 (2000); James M. Dedman IV, Student Author, At Daggers 
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ln Fraser, the Supreme Court dealt with a different kind of 
student speech. Matthew Fraser gave a nomination speech 
involving extensive sexual metaphor and innuendo at an 
ofl'icial high school assembly of some 600 students at Bethel 
High SchooJ.5° Matthew had previously discussed the speech 
with some of his teachers and been advised that it was a poor 
idea and that delivering it might result in serious 
consequences. 51 Students reacted in a variety of ways to 
Matthew's speech; some jeered, some were embarrassed and 
bewildered, and some made sexual gestures. 52 A school rule 
provided that "conduct which materially and substantially 
interferes with the educational process is prohibited, including 
the use of obscene, profane language or gestures."ii:l Under this 
rule, the assistant principal suspended Fraser for three days 
(of which he actually only served two) and removed his name 
from the list of possible graduation speakers.54 Fraser 
appealed this decision through the school review process, but 
the hearing officer also found the speech to be "indecent, lewd 
and offensive," and upheld the school's decision.55 
In a Section 1983 civil rights action alleging First 
Amendment and Due Process violations, the district court 
ruled for Fraser, finding that the school's rule was too vague 
and overly broad and that his constitutional speech and due 
process rights had been violated.56 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, 
Drawn: The Confederate Flag and the School Classroom -- A Cose Study of a Brohen 
First Amendment Forrnnla, fi:l Kaylor L. Rev. 877 (2001). 
fiO. nethel, 4 78 U.S. 675. In his concurrence, ,) ustice Brennan reproduces the 
speech, see id. at 687; the text is included inj"ra. in Appendix 1. 
fi I. !d. at 678. 
fi2. ld. The dissent quotes the Court of Appeals view on the impact: "The record 
now before us yields no evidence that Fraser's usc of a sexual innuendo in his speech 
mat.enally interfered with activities at Bethel High School. While the students' 
reaction to Fraser's speech may fairly be eharactcrized as boisterous, it was hardly 
disruptive of the educational process. In the words of Mr. McCutcheon, the school 
eounselor whose testimony the District reli(eS upon, the reaction of the student body 
'was not atypical to a high school auditorium assembly.' Tn our view. a noisy response 
to the speech and sexually suggestive movements by three students in a crowd of 600 
fail to rise to the level of a material interference with the educational process that 
justifies impinging upon Fraser'.~ First Amendment right to express himself freely." !d. 
at 69:3 -6B4 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
53. ld. at 678. 
fii. !d. Because of the district court's order and a write-in campai~n by other 
students, Fraser actually spoke at graduation. !d. at G79. 
Gfi. til. ot 678-679. 
:)()_ The court. awarded Fraser $278, plus $12,750 in costs. Froser u. Het.hel Sch. 
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taking note that the school counselor characterized student 
response to Fraser's speech as "not atypical," and finding no 
evidence in the record that Fraser's speech "materially 
interfered with the activities at Bethel High School." 57 The 
Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Fraser's lewd and 
offensive speech was easily distinguishable from the political 
speech in Tinker. 
Compared to its approach in Tinker, the Court in Fraser 
cast the student speech in an entirely different light, by 
considering it against the backdrop of the whole purpose of 
public education. 58 The Court noted that while such offensive 
speech might be protected for adults, it did not necessarily 
follow that such speech would be acceptable among students in 
school settings. 59 Finding the speech here to be lewd and 
offensive (but otherwise less then obscene), with sexual content 
disturbing to some teachers and students, and particularly 
inappropriate where some students were only fourteen years 
old, the Court wrote, "Surely it is a highly appropriate function 
of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and 
offensive terms in public discourse."60 The Court recognized 
the school's need to disassociate itself from speech such as 
Fraser's and held that it was well within its authority to do so 
by punishing Fraser. Distinguishing Tinker because there was 
nothing political in Fraser's speech, the Court concluded that 
the First Amendment "does not prevent the school officials 
from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such 
as respondent's would undermine the school's basic educational 
mission."61 The Court found that a mandatory high school 
assembly was "no place for a sexually explicit monologue 
directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage 
students." In such a setting, "it was perfectly appropriate for 
the school to disassociate itself to make the point to the pupils 
that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent 
with the 'fundamental values' of public school education."62 
Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356 (1985). 
57. Bethel, 478 U.S. at 693-694. 
58. Id. at 681. 
59. Id. at 682 (citing Cohen v. Cal., 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (wearing jacket that said 
"F- the Draft" in the courthouse)). 
60. Id. at 683. 
61. Id. at 685. 
62. Id. at 685-686 (Marshall, J., dissentmg). Justice Brennan, concurring, and 
Justice Marshall, dissenting, focused on the issue of disruption, with Brennan noting, 
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Fraser, thus, significantly narrowed the reach of Tinher. 
After Tinlwr and Fraser, the Supreme Court had discussed two 
distinct types of student speech: non-disruptive, pure political 
speech at school on one hand, and lewd speech at an official 
school assembly on the other. In Hazelwood, the third part of 
"the trilogy," the Supreme Court provided guidance for 
analyzing student speech expressed in a school newspaper. 
Again, the Court declined to follow the Tinker standard, 
establishing instead a less rigorous analysis for constitutional 
protection of speech in a forum that bears the school's 
imprimatur. 
In Hazelwood, the court addressed a free speech claim 
involving two student articles written for the school newspaper 
- one on student pregnancy and the other on divorce and its 
impact on the school community.6a The newspaper was written 
in a school journalism class as part of the curriculum. 
Consistent with school policy, the teacher gave the page proofs 
to the principal who deleted the two stories and the pages 
where they would have run. Whole pages were deleted because 
the principal thought it too late to edit out just the 
questionable stories. The pregnancy story was deleted because 
the principal was concerned that students might be identified, 
even though not named, and because he was concerned about 
the sexual and birth control content and its possible effect on 
younger students. The divorce story was deleted because a 
student criticized her father by name. The district court found 
no First Amendment violation and held for the school; the 
Eighth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court reversed again 
and upheld the school's decision. 
In Hazelwood, the Supreme Court began its analysis by 
quoting Tinl?er to the effect that students cannot 
constitutionally be disciplined "merely for expressing their 
personal views on the school premises . . . unless school 
authorities have reason to believe that such expression will 
'substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge 
upon the rights of other students."'64 The Court then 
recognized that limitations to this proposition are necessary to 
appropriately reflect the environment of schools. Students' 
"in my view the School District failed to demonstrate that respondent's remarks were 
indeed disruptive." 
63. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260. 
61. lei. at 26fj_ 
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speech rights in school are unique to the school setting; they 
are "not automatically coextensive with the first amendment 
rights of adults in other settings."65 Reviewing its precedent in 
Fraser, the Court recalled that the school could discipline a 
student for his lewd and sexual speech even though it was not 
obscene because the school was acting appropriately in seeking 
to "disassociate itself from the speech in a manner that would 
demonstrate to others that such vulgarity is wholly 
inconsistent with the 'fundamental values' of public school 
education."66 The Court also restated its role vis-a-vis the 
school board decision-makers: the school board is the primary 
place for decisions as to the appropriateness of speech, not the 
federal courts. 67 
Against this pragmatic and doctrinal backdrop, the 
Hazelwood opinion first concluded that the school newspaper 
was part of the educational curriculum, not a public forum. 
Consequently, the principal's decision would not be subject to 
the kind of intense review accorded restrictions on speech in 
public forums. 68 The Court then distinguished speech in 
Hazelwood from the type of speech in Tinker; the latter being 
student-initiated speech that occurs on school property, which 
must be tolerated unless substantially disruptive or 
interfering, and the former being speech that bears the school's 
imprimatur and is thus subject to school control.69 For such 
speech bearing the school's imprimatur, the school may 
legitimately exercise "greater control ... to assure that 
participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to 
teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that 
may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the 
views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed 
to the school."70 To this end, there may be certain areas where 
school control of student speech would be justified, including 
school sponsorship of speech "that might reasonably be 
perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or 
65. Id. 
G6. Id. at 26G-2G7. 
G7. ld. at 2()7. 
68. Id. at 268-2G9. 
69. I d. at 271 ("These activities may fairly be characterized as part of the school 
curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as 
they are supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge 
or skills to student participants and audiences."). 
70. Jd. 
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conduct otherwise inconsistent with the shared values of a 
civilized social order, or to associate the school with any 
position other than neutrality on matters of political 
controversy." 71 
Hazelwood, thus, falls between Tinker and Fraser. Under 
Fraser, schools can clearly regulate on-premise speech that is 
lewd and vulgar. After Hazelwood, schools can regulate speech 
seen to have their imprimatur more strictly than other student 
speech. Here concerns about research, grammar, and content 
will be valid, though some level of judgment will be called for. 
While the Supreme Court has not added to its student speech 
jurisprudence72 since Hazelwood in 1988, lower courts have 
decided many such cases, with differing results. 73 
In addition to the true threats doctrine derived from the 
Supreme Court's "trilogy," the court has also identified other 
types of speech that are unprotected by the First Amendment, 
which are relevant to certain school speech cases. Not all 
speech is protected by the First Amendment.74 Obscenity,75 
child pornography, 76 libel, 77 fighting words, 78 incitement to 
violence, 79 and true threats, 80 for example, are not protected. 81 
71. ld at 272 (internal punctuation and citations omitted). 
72. This assumes a separate line of analysis for religious speech. See e.g. Santa 
Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. u. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); see also Chemerinsky, su.pra n. 49, at 
528. 
73. Chemerinsky, supra n. 49, at 528-530. 
74. See e.g. R.A.V. u. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) ("We have recognized that 
"the freedom of speech" referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom 
to disregard these traditional limitations."). 
75. See e.g. Miller u. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 23~24 (1973). 
76. See e.g. N.Y. u. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (New York child pornography 
statute). 
77. See e.g. Beauharnms u. Ill., 343 U.S. 250, 257, 266 (1952) (statute prohibiting 
distribution of libelous pamphlet). 
78. See e.g. Chaplinsky u. N.H., 315 U.S. 568, 571~572 (1942) ("There are certain 
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of 
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the 
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words-those 
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the 
peace."). 
79. Brandenburg u. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969). 
80. Watts u. U.S., a94 U.S. 705, 707 (1969); see also NAACP u. Claiborne 
Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (Evers' speech not a threat); In re A.S., 626 N. W.2d 712, 
719-720 (Wis. 2001) (rejecting incitement and focusing on true threats). 
81. See gen.era.lly Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Free Speech and the Right to 
Offend: Old Wars, New Battles, Different Media, 18 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. ()71, G75 (2002); 
Calvert, supra n. :~7, at 246, 254, 263; Justin Myer Lichterman, Student Author, True 
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Of these exceptions, true threat analysis is potentially most 
relevant to school speech concerns.82 While the Supreme Court 
has recognized a threat as an exception to First Amendment 
protection, it has not yet provided a concrete method of 
analysis. 83 
In Watts v. United States, the Supreme Court considered 
whether Watts should be convicted of knowingly and willfully 
threatening the President. At a rally at the Washington 
Monument, the eighteen-year-old Watts said: 
They always holler at us to get an education. And now I 
have already received my draft classification as 1-A and 
I have got to report for my physical this Monday coming. 
I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the 
first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J. They are 
not going to make me kill my black brothers.84 
Taken at its face value, Watts' comment constituted a 
threat. Notwithstanding, the court concluded that "[w]hat is a 
threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally 
protected speech."85 Here the court found that the remarks 
were not a true threat, but political hyperbole. 
Since Watts, the Court has left the development of true 
threat analysis to the circuit and state courts86 where the 
Threats: Evolving Mens Rea Requirements for Violations of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), 22 
Cardozo L. Rev. 1961 (2001); Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True 
Threats, 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 283 (2001); Lisa M. Pisciotta, Student Author, 
Beyond Sticks & Stones: A First Amendment Framework For Educators Who Seek To 
Punish Student Threats, 30 Seton Hall L. Rev. 635 (2000); Steven G. Gey, The 
Nuremberg Files and the First Amendment Value of Threats, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 541, 545-
549 (2000) (arguing that incitement should be the standard). 
82. Recent school case analysis seems more focused on true threats, compare In re 
A.S., 626 N.W.2d at 719, with Jones 64 S.W.3d at 784 (discussing fighting words in 
context of criminal case regarding terroristic threatening). 
83. Planned Parenthood of ColumbiaJWillamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life 
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1072 (9th Cir. 2002) ("The Supreme Court has provided 
benchmarks, but no definition"); see also, Doe v. Pulaski County Spec. Sch. Dist., 306 
F'.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir. 2002). 
84. Watts, 394 U.S. at 706. 
85. Id. at 707. 
86. The Supreme Court may provide further guidance on threats in Black v. 
Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 7:38 (Va. 2001), in which certiorari has been granted. 
Black involves a First Amendment challenge by defendants convicted under a Virginia 
statute prohibiting cross burning with the intent to intimidate. See Va. Code Ann. § 
18.2-423 (2002). The Virginia Supreme Court found for the defendants, concluding 
that the speech involved was symbolic expression protected under the First 
Amendment that could not be regulated based on content. The majority of the Virginia 
Supreme court rejected the true threat analysis. 
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results have not been consistent. The recent Eighth Circuit 
opinion in Doe v. Pulaski County Special School District, 87 
summarizes the true threat cases and concludes that "[a]ll the 
courts to have reached the issue have consistently adopted an 
objective test that focuses on whether a reasonable person 
would interpret the purported threat as a serious expression of 
an intent to cause a present or future harm."88 The courts are 
not aligned, however, in their view as to the perspective from 
which the threat should be analyzed. Specifically, some courts 
would focus on whether a reasonable person in the speaker's 
position would foresee that the recipient would view the 
remarks as a threat, while others would focus on whether a 
reasonable person in the recipient's position would perceive the 
remarks as a threat. 
The Pulaski case involved an Eminem-type rap song 
written by an eighth grader while he was away from school 
premises during summer break.89 The rap song was written by 
J.M. to his ex-girlfriend, K.G. 90 The song threatens rape, 
sodomy, and murder.91 A friend of J.M.'s saw the song, took a 
copy without J.M.'s permission, and gave K.G. a copy at school. 
Another friend of K.G.'s then reported to the school resource 
officer that KG. was worried. The resource officer notified the 
principal who conducted his own investigation, including 
meeting with the students involved. The principal then 
suspended J.M. and recommended he be expelled for the rest of 
his eighth grade year for violating the school's rule regarding 
terroristic threats. 92 Following the school's review procedure, 
87. Pulask,:, :106 F.ad at 622-62:3. See also Jones, 64 S.W. 3d at 734-735; C.C.H., 
651 N. W.2d at 706. See generally Rothman, supra. n. 81, at 287-289. 
88. Pulaski, :306 F.ad at 622. 
89. ld. at 619. '!'he song is included in Appendix 1. See also Jones, 64 S.W.ad 728 
(discussed ,:n(ra, at n. 221) (violent rap song). 
90. Such slighting behaviors are all too often the basis for threatening and violent 
response. Telephone interview with Nancy Bloomfield, School Psychologist (May 22, 
2002). 
91. Pulaski, :306 F.:3d at 619. 
92. ld. at 620. The school rule provided: 
Rule :36. Terroristic Threatening-Threats of Serious Physical Injury or 
Property Damage/Threats to Teachers/Staff 
Students shall not, with the purpose of terrorizing another person, threaten 
to cause death or serious physical injury or substantial property damage to 
another person or threaten physical injury to teachers or to school 
employees ... Student will be suspended immediately and recommended for 
expulsion. 
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J.M. appealed this decision to the Director of Student Services, 
who recommended that J.M. be suspended from regular school, 
but be allowed to attend the district's alternative school for the 
semester. J.M. started at the alternative school and appealed 
the decision to the school board which not only extended the 
suspension to a full year, but also revoked the option to attend 
the alternative school. 93 
J.M. then sued the school district challenging these 
decisions. 94 The district court found the rap piece to be 
constitutionally protected and ordered the school district to 
revoke the expulsion. 95 On appeal, a divided Eighth Circuit 
affirmed, finding that the rap song was not a true threat. The 
court found particularly compelling the fact that ,J.M. did not 
himself show the song to K.G., that K.G. didn't know of past 
events where J.M. had been violent, and that the two continued 
to see each other socially.96 However, in rehearing the case en 
bane, the Eighth Circuit upheld the school's decision to expel, 
explicitly adopting the reasonable recipient test. 97 In reaching 
its conclusion, the Eighth Circuit observed that the speaker 
need not intend to communicate the threat or be capable of 
carrying out the threat, but must only be required to 
"intentionally or knowingly" communicate the remarks to 
someone, even a third party. 98 The court found such an intent 
9:t Jd. at G20; see also id. at 634-635 (Heaney, J., dissenting). 
94. !d. at 620. 
95. Jd. 
96. Doe u. Pulaski County Spec. Sch. Dis!., 263 F.3d 833, 837-838 (8th Cir. 2001). 
97. Pulaski, 306 F.3d at 624-627; compare Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d 1 Ofill 
(involving the prosecution of anti-abortion activists under the Freedom of Access to 
Clinics Entrances Act (FACE), 18 U.S.C. §§ 248(a)(l), (c) (West 2000)). In Planned 
Parenthood, abortion providers claimed that they had been targeted by the American 
Coalition of Life Activities and others and were threatened by posters calling them 
guilty of killing and crimes against humanity. The majority of the Ninth Circuit, 
sitting en bane and reviewing the matter de novo as a question of law, found these 
posters to be true threats and legitimately subject to government regulation. The 
majority describes its test as a "reasonable speaker" test: "a statement which, in the 
entire CQntext and under all the circumstances, a reasonable person would foresee 
would be interpreted by those to whom the statement is communicated as a serious 
expression of intent to inflict hodily harm upon that person. So defined, a threatening 
statement that violates FACE is unprotected under the F'irst Amendment." ld. at 
1074, 1077 (emphasis added). 
98. Pulaski, 306 F.3d at 624; see also Planned Parenthood, 290 F'.:ld at 1071 
(intentionally communicating threat, not ability to carry out); hut see Planned 
Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1092 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (regarding threats involving 
harm within the speaker's control; "From the point of view of the victims, it makes 
little difference whether the violence against them will come from the makers of the 
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to communicate here, thus making Doe "accountable if a 
reasonable recipient would have viewed the letter as a threat," 
as did thirteen-year-old K.G. 99 
In reaching its conclusion and by reviewing the precedent, 
the Eighth Circuit observed that as a practical matter, "the 
debate over the approaches appears to us to be largely 
academic because in the vast majority of cases the outcome will 
be the same under both tests." 100 Noting that "only in the 
extremely rare case" would the results be different depending 
on whether a speaker or recipient-based test was used, the 
court reported that it had found "no case where such a 
situation has ever been presented." 101 This observation that all 
the debate over a speaker/recipient focus for a test of true 
threats may be moot in the face of reality is further supported 
by the idea that whichever test the courts adopt, they also 
consider surrounding factors. That is, for example, a court 
using the recipient focus, also examines other factors, some of 
which involve the speaker. 1o2 
Following the Eighth Circuit's lead, combining the 
attributes that the majority of courts have addressed would 
suggest a test based on the standard of "whether a reasonable 
person_woJJld foresee that the statement would be interpreted 
by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a 
serious expression of intent to harm," when considered in light 
of the surrounding circumstances including the perception of 
the listener. 10a Such a test for constitutionally unprotected 
posters or from unrelated third parties; bullets kill their victims regardless of who pulls 
the trigger. But it makes a difference for the purpose of the First Amendment.") 
!'l!'l. Pulaski, a06 F.ad at 624. 
100. Id. at 623. 
101. !d. (emphasis added). 
l 02. For example, the Pulaski court has identified a non-exhaustive list of factors 
that are relevant to whether a reasonable person would perceive an actual threat. 
Those factors include: 1) the reaction of those who heard the alleged threat; 2) 
whether the threat was conditional; 3) whether the person who made the 
alleged threat communicated it directly to the object of the threat; 4) whether 
the speaker had a history of making threats against the person purportedly 
threatened; and 5) whether the recipient had a reason to believe that the 
speaker had a propensity to engage in violence. 
ld (citing U.S. "· Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996)); see also C.C.ll., 651 
N.W.2d 702. 
10:~. Kg. Louell 11. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(emphasis added); see ali;o Milo M., 740 N.E. 2d 967; D.L.D. u. St., 815 S.2d 74(;, 748 
(2002) (continued conduct would likely substantially emotionally upset any normal 
person under the reasonable person standard under a credible threat analysis). Other 
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speech seems broad enough to encompass the other criteria we 
now recognize as valuable for threat assessment. Even such a 
combined view, however, focuses less on distinctions as to 
source and perception, and does not call adequate attention to 
many of the crucial factors. In today's parlance, a more reality-
based view that focuses more particularly on the contextual 
realities of today' s schools may be needed 
PART 3. A MEDLEY OF OTHER STUDENT SPEECH CASES 
School speech104 cases since the Supreme Court "trilogy" 
run the gamut in terms of context and subject matter. There 
are cases involving spoken words. 105 There are also cases 
iterations are discussed throughout the article. This rendition is offered as a basis for 
general discussion of how court tests relate to threat assessment methodology. 
104. Threat cases arise in other contexts outside the realm of First Amendment 
speech, including Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims. See e.g. Edwards 
u. Rees, 883 F.2d 882 (lOth Cir. 1989) (holding that constitutional rights were not 
violated when a student was interrogated for twenty minutes regarding a bomb 
threat); Williams ex rei. Allen v. Bd. of Educ., 186 F. Supp. 2d 808 (S.D. Ohio 2002) 
(dealing with Fourth Amendment probable cause issues arising out of police detentions 
for school-related threats); Brian A. v. Stroudsburg Area Sch. Dist., 14 I F. Supp. 2d 
502 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that a student expelled for making a bomb threat 
("There's a bomb in this School bang bang!!) was not deprived of due process); In the 
Matter of t.he Expulsion of E.J. W. from lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 500, 632 N.W.2d 775 
(Minn. App. 2001) (holding that a student has a due process right to know names of 
student witnesses in case of bomb threat written on bathroom mirror); Makemson v. 
Chesapeake Pub. Sch., 52 Va. Cir. 356 (2000) (administrative appeal on due process 
issues from school board expulsion under zero tolerance for bomb threat). 
105. Such cases are discussed throughout the article. The Louisiana Supreme 
Court's opinion on two incidents of threatening speech in the school context is 
illustrative. RT, 781 S.2d 1239. RT fit the stereotype of the Columbine shooters. He 
wore black, listened to heavy metal and had a delinquency record. Just after 
Columbine, classmates at this high school asked RT if he were going to blow up the 
school. RT replied that he was. ld. at 1241. He also had what a classmate described 
as an "offhand" conversation about shooting those people he didn't like in the biology 
class and about how simple he thought it would be to do so or to carry out a shooting at 
group activities like graduation. ld. at 1242. At the time, his classmate did not report 
the conversation, and continued to sit next to RT. In other words, apparently they did 
not show immediate fear of RT. RT was subsequently charged with two criminal 
offenses, terroristic threatening, and communicating false information. In an analysis 
reminiscent of Tinker, the court found for the student since the state produced "no 
evidence that any statements made to this witness by RT could have caused any public 
disruption or could have caused fear in any person other than CM," and she apparently 
was not frightened. Without evidence of "sustained fear," the charge could not be 
upheld. Id. As to the bomb threat, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded 
differently. Here all that was necessary was for the state to show that the words were 
said, of which there was ample evidence. !d. at 1243-1244. Here, in response to RT's 
claim under the First Amendment, the court resolved the balance in favor of the state's 
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ranging from t-shirts 106 and uniforms, 107 to artwork, 108 
newspapers, 109 computer screens, no and walls.ll 1 The court has 
legitimate interest in making bomb threats subject to criminal action, 
"notwithstanding that the crime is committed through the medium of speech." Id. at 
12·13; see also La. Rev. Stat.§§ 14:40.1.A; 14:54.1.A (1997). 
106. E.g. Chambers v. Babbitt, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (D. Minn. 2001) (holding that 
plaintiffs will likely to prevail on "Straight Pride" t-shirt). See also Sypniewski v. Bd. 
of Educ., 2002 U.S. App. LEXlS 20814 (3d Cir. 2002) (upholding suspension for 
wearing Jeff Foxworthy t-shirt with redneck jokes under Tinker-type analysis); Boroff 
u. Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that school could prohibit Marilyn 
Manson t-shirts under a Bethell Fra.ser-Hazelwood-type analysis); Pyle v. So. Hadley 
Sch. Comm., 55 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that district court's certification of 
state law question was warranted), certifying question to Pyle v. So. Hadley Sch. 
Comm., 667 N.E.2d 869 (Mass. 1996) (finding that under Massachusetts statutory law, 
public high school students had the freedom to engage in non-school sponsored 
expression that may have been reasonably considered vulgar but caused no disruption); 
Castorina ex rel. Rewt v. Madison County Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that wearing t-shirts with confederate flag is protected speech under a Tinker 
ana.lysis). 
107. E.g. Littlefield v. Forney lndep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(upholding school uniform policy); Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 437 (5th 
Cir. 200 1) (upholding school uniform policy); Vines v. Bd. of Educ., 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 382 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (upholding school dress code requiring solid black and white 
clothing); Chalifonx u. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659 (1997) (holding 
that it is unconstitutional to prohibit wearing rosary outside of clothing); Phillips u. 
Anderson Connty Sch. Dist. Five, 987 F. Supp. 488 (D.S.C. 1997) (upholding discipline 
action for violation of dress code by wearing jacket made to look like confederate flag 
where there was a showing of substantial disruption). See generally, ACLU, All Dressed 
Up and Nowhere to Go: Students and Their Parents Fight School Uniform Policies 
<archive.aclu.org/features/fll0499a.html> (accessed June 2, 2003). 
108. See e.g. Boman, infra n. 114; In re McCoy, 742 N.E.2d 247 (discussion, supra 
n. 31) (emphasis added); West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358 (lOth 
Cir. 2000) (upholding disciplinary action against student for drawing confederate flags 
where evidence of racial tensions in school). 
109. Pangle, 10 P.3d 275 (dealing with student articles containing a list of acts 
such as blowing up things, stink bombs, bomb threats, computer viruses, that the 
author would like to see happen to people who ran the school). 
llO. E.g. J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412 (Pa. Cmmw. 2000) 
(dealing with a student created Internet website containing threatening and offensive 
speech); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 4.15, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000) 
(discussed infra n. 269); St. v. Mortimer, 542 S.E.2d 330 (N.C. App. 2001). Mortimer is 
a computer screensaver case that is also a good illustration of the "perceived threat." 
The incident in question in Mortimer occurred in the immediate wake of the Columbine 
shootings, and at a point where rumors were rampant that Joshua's high school would 
be bombed on May 4th. A student in keyboarding class discovered, also on May 4th, a 
screen saver that said, "The end is near." Joshua told the police investigator that he 
had written the message hut "didn't mean anything by it. Joshua said he put it there 
for the meaning of the end of the school year or the end of time, or whatever." On 
review for insufficient evidence, the North Carolina appeals court dismissed, finding 
that the message was not a threat, but only a statement that could perhaps be 
interpreted as threatening. The court noted that while people were justifiably afraid 
about what the words could mean, no one could articulate what they did mean. In fact, 
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also considered matters ranging from satire, 112 to vtcwus or 
sexually oriented verbal attacks, ll~J to perceived threats. 111 
several students testified that they didn't know what the words meant. In reaching its 
conclusion. the court particularly observed that it was "significant that [thcJ defendant 
was never connected with any of the alleged bomb threats at the school. There was no 
evidence [that the] defendant had any plans to physically injure anyone or damage 
school property. He had exhibited good behavior at the school prior to this incident. 
The arresting officer testified [that] he determined the message written on the 
computer was 'a prank."' ld; see also Student Press L. Ctr., Student Sues School after 
Being Suspended for Comment about Columbine on Internet Discussion Board 
<http://www.splc.org/newsflash.asp?id=117> (Oct. 20, 1999) (accessed Jan. 15, 2003). 
Ill. E.g. E.J. W., 632 N .W .2d 775 (mirror). 
112. E.J?. Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1088-1089 (considering the 
expulsion/suspension for mock obituary website created at home hy eighteen-year-old 
high school co-captain of the basketball team with 3.95 grade point average and no 
disciplinary record not upheld where court recognized the obituaries as "written 
tongue-in-cheek, inspired, apparently, by a creative writing class last year in which 
students were assigned to write their own obituary."). 
113. See e.J?. Killion v. Franklin Reg/. Sch. Dist., Ja6 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 
2001) (student suspended for publishing nasty Top Ten list regarding athletic director); 
.J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist. 794 A.2d 936 (Pa. Cmmw. 2002) (upholding 
suspension for derogatory comments and threatening comments); Beussink 1'. 
Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (vicious vulgar school 
criticism); see also Iota XI Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity 11. George Mason U., 99:1 
F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding that fraternity's "ugly woman contest" skit protected 
by First Amendment). 
114. Labeling a threat as a perceived threat begs the question and much of the 
legal analysis of the appropriate test to determine a true threat. Still, there are some 
cases where the school's reaction seems so much an overreaction that this terminology 
seems appropriate. See e.g. Boman v. Bluestem Unified Sch. Dist. No. 205, 2000 WL 
297167 (D. Kan. 2000) (preliminary injunction) and Roman u. Bluestem Unified Sch. 
Dist. No. 205, 2000 WL 433083 (D. Kan. 2000) (permanent injunction). In Boman, 
Sarah Boman, a seventeen-year-old senior honor student at Bluestem High School 
created an unsigned poster for art class and hung it on the door in the school hallway. 
The poster was a spiral of calligraphy, a form called concrete poetry with words in a 
shape; the art was a depiction of a madman's view about someone killing his dog. (The 
text and a graphic image of the poster are included in Appendix 1.) The principal said 
he found the poster threatening and suspended Sarah for five days, a suspension that 
was later extended for the rest of the school year, over eighty days. The school hearing 
officer found that Sarah thought of the poster as a work of art, that it was not 
uncommon for art projects to be unsigned, that no students were concerned or 
complained, that "the allegedly threatening language in the poster was not readily 
apparent, and that nothing in the poster directs a threat at any particular individuaL" 
Against the recommendation of the hearing officer that Sarah be reinstated, the school 
board said that Sarah could only return to school, on probation, after a satisfactory 
psychological evaluation. Boman, 2000 WL 297167. On First Amendment grounds, the 
court followed a Tinker analysis and ruled for Sarah, not finding a threat of, or actual, 
disruption. Id. at 4. See generally ACLU, ACJ,[J Vows Lega.l Action Ouer Honor 
Student's Expulsion for Displaying Artwork <http://www.aclu.org/news/2000/ 
n012000a.html> (Jan. 20, 2000) (accessed Jan. 15, 2003); Compl., Boman u. Bluestem 
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 205 (D. Kan) in ACLU in the Conrts, 
<archive.aclu.org/court/boman_ complaint.html> (accessed .June 2, 2003); Mark Walsh, 
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Teachers, 115 administrators, !Hi fellow students, 117 and schools 
and their facilities have all been targets_ us 
When compared to the Free Speech difficulties that schools 
face today, the issues raised by Tinher, Fraser, and Hazelwood 
seem tame indeed. 119 This is especially true as the Internet 
dramatically expands the geographical area and the potential 
recipients of troubling speech. 120 With the ability to post and 
access speech from on and off school premises, schools are now 
faced with students' technological ability both to torment other 
students 1 ~ 1 and to interfere with school activities. 122 As the 
f"aw Update: Fine Line between Dangerous and Harmless Student Expression, 19 
Educ. Week 14 (Mar. 8, 2000); Sarah Cottrell Stokes, Less Than Zero-Tolerance, 
WireTap Mag. (,June 1:!, 2000) (originally appeared on <www.missclick.com>) 
(avail able at <http:www .wiretap mag .org/print.html?Story ID=9296&w iretap=yes>) 
(accessed ,Jan. 1(), 200:!). 
115. See e.g. In the Interest of J.H., 797 A.2d 260, 261 (Pa. Super. 2002) (student 
telling teacher that "it would be the last thing [the teacher] ever did"); In re Ricky T., 
105 Cal. !{ptr. 2d 165 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 2001) (student telling teacher that ''I'm going 
to get you"); In re: Ingmar C., 2001 Cal. App. unpub. LEXIS 601 at 58 (Cal. App. 6th 
Dist. 2001) (unpublished opinion); Milo M., 740 N.E. 2d 967 (gory drawings of teacher) 
(discussion infra n. 125); J.S., 757 A.2d 412 (student website stating why teacher 
should die, and soliciting money for hit man). See also St. v. Avila, 10 P.3d 486 (Wash. 
2000), reuiew denied, 21 P.8d 290 (Wash. 2001) (student threatening to blow off 
teacher's head); Michael Easterbrook, Taking Aim at Violence, Psycho!. Today (July 1, 
Hl99) (high school student Aaron Leese saying, "Man, if I don't pass this class, I'm 
going to be mad enough to kill."); E-mail from Kathryn Sheridan, school teacher, to 
Sarah E. Redfield, author (June 19, 2002) (copy on file with the author). 
I Hi. See e.g. In re: Jared 0., 2002 WL 265057 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 2002) (not 
officially published) (student threatening to "take out" vice principal). 
117. E.g. -Jones, 64 S.W.8d 728; Pulaski, 806 F.3d 616; Commonwealth v. Troy T., 
766 N.E.2d 519 (Mass. App. 2002). 
118. See e.g. Pangle, 10 P.8d 275; RT, 781 S.2d 1239; In re ,J.C., 751 A.2d 1178 (Pa. 
Super. 2000). In re B.R., 732 A.2d 633 (Pa. Super. 1999). 
119. See Dahlia Lithwick, Poster Children, Slate Mag. (May 22, 2002) (available at 
<http://slate.msn.com/?id=2066la0>) (accessed Jan. 15, 2008) (noting the relationship 
between threats and incitement, and observing that "[t]hese days shouting fire in a 
crowded theater seems almost sweet."). 
120. Certainly, Internet speech is protected by the First Amendment. See e.g. Reno 
t'. ACU!, 521 U.S. 84-1 (1997) (finding the Communications Decency Act of 1996 
unconstitutional). See also Am. Library Assn, Inc. v. U.S., 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E. D. 
Pa. 2002), probable jurisdiction noted, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 8830 (2002) (finding the 
Children's Internet Protection Act's requirements that libraries use Internet filters as 
condition for receipt of federal subsidies unconstitutional). This does not, however, 
answer the more difficult factual and legal questions regarding threats conveyed by 
means of the Internet. 
121. See e.g. Coy u. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (middle 
school student suspended for using school computers to access a website containing a 
crude description of other students as "losers"); see also John Carvel, 'One in I<ou.r 
Teens' is Victim of Text Message Bullying, The Guardian (London), Guardian Home 
Pages 9 (Apr. 15, 2002); Susan H. Kosse, Student Designed Home Web Pages: Does Title 
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Tinker Court would put it, schools are now faced with vast new 
avenues for potential disruption. While the off-site origin of 
Internet speech distinguishes it somewhat from the nature and 
type of speech implicated in Tinker, 1n the potential for 
disruption from off-site sources remains. 124 
The Internet is an important part of our general concern 
about the violence that now engulfs schools. Today, this 
"virtual" dimension of school violence has added a whole new 
level of meaning to the idea of fear of disruption suggested by 
Tinker. The courts certainly recognize this violence. One court 
has even taken judicial notice of it, 125 while others suggest that 
IX or the First Amendment Apply? 43 Ariz. L. Rev. 905, 905-906 (2001); Patt Morrison, 
Behind the Tragedy, the Despair of an Outcast, L.A. Times B 1 (Mar. 7, 200 1). 
122. See e.g. Boucher v. Sch. Bd., 134 F. 3d 821 (1997) (high school student expelled 
for publishing an underground newspaper column with instructions for hacking into 
school computers). 
123. See e.g. Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 2002 WL 857595 at 6-7 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (using 
the Tinker standard to analyze a case involving a student website that was created off 
of school premises). 
124. The Internet discipline cases provide an interesting subset of student speech. 
This article focuses on threatening speech on the Internet and elsewhere, but other free 
speech issues arise in other Internet contexts as well. Cases of offensive speech are 
common, where students criticize and mock their schools, administrators, teachers, and 
other students, and they have evoked both school disciplinary response and private 
litigation. See e.g. Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (student punished for content of 
home-created web page); Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d 791 (student punished for creating and 
accessing unauthorized website via school computer); Press Release, Am. Civ. Liberties 
Union, Washington Court Upholds Student Free Speech Rights on Internet (July 18, 
2000) <http://www.aclu.org/news/2001/n022001a.htm1) (accessed Jan. 20, 2003) (high 
school student wins $10,000 for emergency expulsion for parody of school principal); see 
generally Melissa L. Gilbert, Student Author "Time-Out" for Student Threats?: 
Imposing a Duty to Protect on School Officials, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 917 (2002); Kosse, 
supra n. 121; Louis John Seminski, Jr., Student Author, Tinkering With Student Free 
Speech: The Internet and the Need for a. New Standard, 33 Rutgers LJ. 165 (200 1); 
David L. Hudson, Jr., Censorship of Student Internet Speech: The Effect of Diminishing 
Student Rights, Fear of the Internet and Columbine, 2000 L. Rev. Mich. St. U. Det. C.L. 
199, 211-213 (2000); Calvert & Richards, supra n. 81, at 678, 685-686; Leora Harpaz, 
Internet Speech and the First Amendment Rights of Public School Students, 2000 
B.Y.U. Educ. & L.J. 123 (2000); Garner K. Weng, Type No Evil: The Proper Latitude ol 
Public Educational Institutions in Restricting Expressions of Their Students on the 
Internet, 20 Hastings Commun. & Ent. L.J. 751 (1998). 
125. Milo M., 740 N.E. 2d at 973. In Milo M., the twelve-year-old student was 
suspended from school for three days for drawing a picture of shooting his teacher. He 
was adjudicated delinquent and sentenced to over five years of probation for violating 
Massachusetts criminal law against threatening. While not discussing the First 
Amendment directly, the Massachusetts Supreme Court particularly noted: "Finally, 
given the recent highly publicized school-related shootings by students, we take judicial 
notice of the actual and potential violence in public schools." Id. (emphasis added). 
The Court specifically listed the incidents at Moses Lake, Washington; Bethel, Alaska; 
Pearl, Mississippi; Paducah, Kentucky; Jonesboro, Arkansas; Edinboro, Pennsylvania; 
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the judicial observance of Columbine-like violence has gone too 
far.l26 
These modern-day realities, made possible by 
advancements in technology, call more attention to the 
antiquated definitions of true threats and threat assessment 
and suggest that true threats in school, like other 
constitutional concepts, might need to be defined differently-
with less concern for the fine points of constitutional analysis 127 
and more focus on the particular factors that are relevant to 
the modern school environment.128 
There is mounting evidence that violent students have 
given clues about their states of mind and that their intentions 
were "spoken," often in student writings, before many of the 
tragic school shootings. Thus, while the need to protect First 
Amendment rights of students surely remains, the need to 
identifY and assess these warnings has become more 
compelling. The Ninth Circuit, in a case about a student poem 
written against the backdrop of school shootings, directly 
addressed the need to strike this tenuous balance between 
school officials' need to provide a safe school environment, and 
students' First amendment right to free expression: 
This case has its genesis in a high school student's 
poem, which led to his temporary, emergency expulsion 
from schooL It arises against a backdrop of tragic school 
Fayetteville, Tennessee; Springfield, Oregon; Richmond, Virginia; and, Littleton, 
Colorado. !d. With these incidents in mind, the court concluded that "although there 
is no evidence that the juvenile possessed an immediate ability to carry out the threat 
at the time he communicated the drawing to Mrs. F, this does not mean that [the 
juvenile] could not have carried out his threat at a later time." ld. The relevant 
Massachusetts law provided, "If complaint is made to any such court or justice that a 
person has threatened to commit a crime against the person or property of another, 
such court or justice shall examine the complainant and any witnesses who may be 
produced, on oath, reduce the complaint to writing and cause it to be subscribed by the 
complainant." !d. at 969; see also Mass. General Laws ch. 275, § 2; Jessica Portner, 
Violent Drawing Was a Real Threat, Mass. Court Rules, Educ. Week (Jan. 17, 2001). 
126. See In re: Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725, 747 (2001). (Crooks, J. concurring), 
(expressing opinion that the court cannot take judicial notice of "much of this 
information"). 
127. Pulaski, 306 F.3d at 628. 
128. The Court has certainly recognized this possibility regarding school searches, 
as well as school speech. See e.g. Rd. of Educ. v. Earls, 586 U.S. 822 (2002); Vernonia 
Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653-657 (1995); N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 825, 
856-340 (1985); Tinker, 393 U.S. 503; Wallace by Wallace v. Batavia Sch. Dist. 101, 68 
F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting the "unique constitutional position" of public 
school students). 
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shootings, occurring both before and after the events at 
issue here, and requires us to evaluate through a 
constitutional prism the actions school officials took to 
address what they perceived was the student's implied 
threat of violent harm to himself and others. Given the 
knowledge the shootings at Columbine, Thurston and 
Santee high schools, among others, have imparted about 
the potential for school violence (as rare as these 
incidents may be when taken in context), 129 we must 
take care when evaluating a student's First Amendment 
right of free expression against school officials' need to 
provide a safe school environment not to overreact in 
favor of either. Schools must be safe, but they are 
educational institutions after all, and speech-including 
creative writing and poetry-is an essential part of the 
educational fabric. 13° 
When student threats are subjected to the judicial 
process, 131 there is a need for the type of care called for here by 
the Ninth Circuit. In broad terms, such cases have many 
facets and indeed many venues, and each requires the utmost 
care. Student threats can lead to criminal prosecution, 132 and 
129. It is helpful to understand the context of the school violence to which the court 
refers. The U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Department of Education put it this way: 
"To put the problem of targeted school-based attacks in context, from 199:~ to 1997 the 
odds that a child in grades nine through twelve would be threatened or injured with a 
weapon in schools were 7 to 8 percent, or one in thirteen or fourteen; the odds of getting 
into a physical fight at schools were 15 percent, or one in seven. In contrast, the odds 
that a child would die in school-by homicide or suicide are, fortunately, no greater 
than l in a million. In 1998, students in grades nine through twelve were the victims of 
1.6 million thefts and 1.2 million nonfatal violent crimes, while in this same period 
sixty school-associated violent deaths were reported for this student population." 
Vossekuil eta!., supra n. 3, at 6. Of course, the report goes on to note that "the impact 
of targeted, school-based attacks cannot be measured in statistics alone." /d. at 1 a. 
130. LaVine, 257 F.3d at 983. 
131. The reported cases are only a portion of the cases schools encounter. For 
articles containing a compilation of other such incidents reported in the press, see Clay 
Calvert, Free Speech and Public Schools in a Post-Columbine World: Check Your 
Speech Rights at the Schoolhouse Metal Detector, 77 Denv. U. L. Rev. 739 (2000); 
McKinney, supra n. 3, at 1347; Kathleen Conn & Perry A. Zirkel, Legal Aspects of" 
internet Accessibility and Use in K-12 Public Schools: What Do School Districts Need to 
Knou?, 146 Educ. L. Rep. I, 15-16 (2000). 
132. Fur example, federal law makes it a crime to threaten the President and to 
use the mail or interstate commerce for certain kinds of threats. See 18 U .S.C. § 115 
(a) (2002) (making it a crime to threaten to assault, kidnap, or murder, a United States 
official, a United States judge, a Federal law enforcement officer); 18 U.S.C. § 844 (e) 
(2002) (threats or conveyance of false information that is threatening through the use 
of the mail, telephone, telegraph, or other instrument of interstate or foreign 
commerce, or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce); 18 U .S.C. § 871 (a) (2002) 
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can also serve as the basis for civil liability in tortLB and under 
statutory provisions. 1 ~31 They also result in school disciplinary 
action, which may become the basis for civil litigation 
challenging school board decisions. 1 ~35 In more particular 
terms, issues surrounding student threats may be reviewed not 
only directly on First Amendment speech grounds, t:JG but also 
on grounds such as testing the sufficiency of the evidence on 
various threat-related charges, 1:37 or evaluating the remedies 
(making it a crime to threaten to kidnap or kill the president or any person in the line 
of succession f(Jr the presidency of the United States, including threats made in the 
mail); 18 U.S.C. § 875 (2002) (making it a crime to use the mail system ur interstate or 
foreign commeree for purposes of extortion). Many state laws make thn~atening speech 
criminal as well. E.g. Ark. Code Ann.§ 5-41-108 (LEXIS L. Publg. 1997): Conn. Gen. 
Stat. § 5:3a-182b (IH90 & Supp. 1995); N.Y. Penal Laws § 240.:{0 (McKinney 1999 & 
Supp. 2002); N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 14-196.3 (2000); Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1304 (1983 & Supp. 
2002); 18 Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. § 2706 (2000); Wis. Stat. § 94 7.(H25 (1995). 
133. See e.g. J.S., 757 A.2d 412, (school principal and math teacher who were 
featured on a student's "Teacher Sux" website filed civil suits against the student). 
There is also the possibility of a tort claim for a threat that causes severe emotional 
distress. See generally Rothman, supra n. 81, at 284. 
!iH. See ~e.g. Suwlberg u. St.amness, 525 N.W.2d ()78 (N.D. 1994). Svedberg is a 
student lawsuit brought against another student under a North Dakota statute 
authorizing a restraining order against incessant taunting. The bullying, f(Jcused on 
the size of Svdeberg's ears, included verbal taunts, making snowmen in the town with 
large ears, and a threat to kill: "You had better watch it !Jumbo or I will kill you." ld. 
at G80. The trial court issued the restraining order, and the North Dakota Supreme 
Court upheld the decision. ld. at 681-~G82. The statute, N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-31.2-01 
(Supp. 1993), specifically stated that it did not apply to "constitutionally protected 
activity," r:d. at ()80-681, and defimdant Stamness raised the First Amendment as a 
basis for excluding the evidence against h1m. The court reviewed the statute in light of 
the fighting words exception to the First Amendment, not the true threat doctrine. ld. 
at ()83-~684. Determining first that the speech is to be measured as interpreted by a 
reasonable person of the same age as Svedberg, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
found the speech and snow effigies to be fighting words unprotected by the First 
Amendment. The dissent took issue with the majority's characterization of the speech 
and behavior here as fighting words. Emphasizing that fighting words are not "those 
that simply inflict emotion injury but must be 'personally abusive epithets which ... as 
a matter of common knowledge iarej inherently likely to provide violent reaction,"' ld. 
at G8G. (Levine, .J. dissenting). The dissent found the matter to be one that is better left 
to parental and school intervention than to the courts. /d. at ()86- G87 (Levine, J., 
dissenting). 
135. The legal issues beyond First Amendment speech issues raised by discipline 
in these cases, such as issues of due process or process under 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq., 
are beyond the scope of this article. It should be noted, however, that special education 
discipline raises distinct issues. 8ee e.g. Rd. o( Ednc. v. L.H., il F. Supp. 2d 1:!99 (N.D. 
Ala. 1998) (fourteen-year-old mentally retarded defendants suspended under court 
order for violent disruptive behavior and threatening to bring gun to school). 
J:1G. See also supra n. 104 (discussing other threat cases arising outside the realm 
of the First Amendment). 
1:37. See e.g. RT, 781 S.2d 12:{9 (sufficient evidence tor bomb threat, but not for 
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assessed. 138 Which causes may be pursued in which venues is 
not always clear. In some instances, school disciplinary action 
may provide the only avenue for redress. 139 In other instances, 
shooting threat); In re: Joseph F., 2002 WL 80298 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 2002) (not 
officially published) (evidence sufficient to prove terrorist threats and annoying 
telephone calls where call made to resident with same last name as school employee 
threatening to "shoot up" the school within a week of San Diego school shooting); In re: 
Jared 0., 2002 WL 265057 (evidence sufficient to show felony criminal threats and use 
of a disguise for student threatening to put down or take out vice principal; reasonable 
sustained fear by excitement and proximity); In re: Ingmar C., 2001 Cal. App. LEX IS 
601 at 58 (evidence insufficient regarding student drawing hanging teacher etc.); In the 
Interest of J.P.L., 2002 WL 725664 (Colo. App. 2002) (not released for publication) 
(evidence sufficient on delinquency adjudication for interference with faculty, staff, or 
students of educational institution where students testified as to defendant's 
statements regarding hit list and targeted students); In re: Foster, 716 N.E.2d 223 
(Ohio App. 4th Dist. 1998) (evidence sufficient to adjudicate delinquency based on 
complicity where the defendant helped another student telephone a bomb threat by 
providing the quarter for the pay phone); J.H., 797 A.2d 260 (evidence sufficient to 
support delinquency adjudication for threatening drama if she reported student to his 
probation officer); In re J.C., 751 A.2d 1178 (evidence sufficient to adjudicate 
delinquency for making terroristic threats where students testified that juvenile 
admitted that she placed threatening handwritten notes and two packages purporting 
to contain bombs in the middle and high schools, and that she pointed out where she 
placed one of the packages in the restroom); In re B.R., 732 A.2d 633 (chit chat 
regarding guns and destruction of school communication system); St. v. G.S., 17 P.3d 
1221 (Wash. App. 2001) (evidence insufficient to prove threat to do bodily injury); see 
also Goldwire, 507 S.E.2d 209 (evidence insufficient to show violation of school rule by 
student peripherally involved with bomb threat). 
138. See e.g. Matter of Gila County Juv. Delinquency Action Nos. DEL 6280, 816 
P.2d 950 (Ariz. App. 1991) (not double jeopardy where students were both expelled and 
subject to delinquency proceedings for telephone bomb threats); Wynne Pub. Schs. v. 
Lockhart, 32 S.W.3d 47 (Ark. App. 2000) (expulsion upheld); Alford v. Sch. Bd. of 
Collier County, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7370 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (refusing to grant 
preliminary injunction and compensatory damages not granted to student claiming 
special education status regarding expulsion, and dismissing the case on jurisdictional 
grounds); B.D.A. v. St., 695 So. 2d 399 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st Dist. 1997) (restitution not 
allowed for teacher and administrative staff salaries when school evacuated because of 
a bomb threat); Polk v. St., 700 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. Dist. App. lst Dist. 1997) (restitution 
not allowed for wages for three-hour evacuation period for false bomb threat); Matter of 
Welfare of D.D.G., 532 N.W.2d 279 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (payment of restitution where 
school was evacuated and searched after bomb threat); St. ex rei. G.S., 749 A.2d 902 
(N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 2000) (state has a constitutional obligation to provide student 
with alternative schooling after expelled and adjudicated delinquent for bomb threat); 
Ladson v. Bd. of Educ., 323 N.Y.S.2d 545 (N.Y. Sup. 1971) (school superintendent may 
not bar student from graduation); St. v. Avila, 10 P.3d 486 (statutory interpretation 
regarding intimidating a school administrator or teacher). 
139. See e.g. Conley v. Doe, 2001 WL 152694 7 (Mass. Super. 2001). Conley held 
that a teacher whose name appeared on student's "People I Want to Kill List" did not 
have cause of action for tort or conspiracy: "While I dismiss the Complaint, I recognize, 
as did the Supreme Judicial Court in Milo M., that there have been some recent highly-
publicized shootings in school, including shootings of teachers, and that teachers 
cannot easily ignore information that a student, even a sixth grade student, wishes 
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criminal proceedings may be a more appropriate route. 140 
Regardless of whether action is taken in a school disciplinary 
proceeding, or in a criminal proceeding, the state cannot 
constitutionally punish the speaker for speech that is protected 
by the First Amendment. Accordingly, cases heard in either 
venue call for constitutional free speech analysis. In the school 
disciplinary proceeding context, this tends to arise in reference 
to the substantial disruption standard enunciated in Tinker. 141 
In the criminal context, it arises primarily in reference to the 
true threat analysis for speech that is not protected by the 
First Amendment (and thus appropriately subject to state 
control via its criminal statutes). 142 
A handful of illustrative civil and criminal speech cases 
provide a context for analyzing judicial intervention in relation 
to threat assessment. The first group consists of four civil 
cases from the federal courts that illustrate an interesting 
combination of analyses. In La Vine, the Ninth Circuit focused 
primarily on a Tinker-type analysis to uphold the school's 
decision to suspend a student for a poem. In Lovell, the Eighth 
Circuit used a true threat analysis to uphold the suspension of 
the student in a case where the evidence as to exactly what the 
student said was unclear. In D.G., the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma used both the 
them dead. By dismissing this Complaint, I am not minimizing Ms. Conley's fears or 
declaring them to be an over-reaction. Rather, I am simply declaring that, when a 
student privately writes down such a death wish but does not act to communicate that 
wish to the teacher he may hate the teacher's remedies rest with the school 
administration, not a court of law." Id. at 4 (internal citation omitted). See also Troy 
T., 766 N.E.2d 519 (holding that the evidence was sufficient to find that a student 
overheard at a shopping mall saying that he was going to "blow up, kill, blow up the 
jocks," and in school saying that he "wanted to gun them down like little dominoes," 
and "Oh, those dumb blondes, you know, they have to go too," constituted threats that 
were insufficient to support adjudication of delinquency.). 
140. See St. v. Dauid F., 1998 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3247 (Conn. Super. 1998) 
(holding that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act allows criminal 
proceedings). 
141. E.g. LaVine, 257 F.3d 981, discussed infra at Part :~(1); but see Lovell, 90 F.3d 
B(J7, discussed infra at Part 3(2). 
142. In the context of criminal proceedings, of course, the first issues will 
necessarily be those of state law, with different criminal provisions coming into play: 
threatening, terroristic threatening, disorderly conduct, etc. For example, whether the 
state statute requires intent may be a question needing initial resolution. Some cases 
then reach the First Amendment analysis and some do not. Compare Douglas D., 626 
N.W. 2d 725 (reaching analysis); C.C.H., 651 N.W.2d 702 (reaching analysis) with Milo 
M., 740 N.E. 2d 967 (not reaching analysis); In re B.R., 732 A.2d 633 (not reaching 
analysis); Goldw1:re, 507 S.E2d 209 (not reaching analysis). 
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Tinlwr-type and the true threat analyses sequentially to reject 
the school's decision to suspend a student for more than a 
semester. 14 :l 
The next group of cases, A.S. and Douglas D., were criminal 
cases decided at the same time by the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court. Analyzing the speech for its threatening content, in 
A.S., the court found that the First Amendment did not protect 
the student speech in question. ln Douglas D., the court 
applied a Tinher-type analysis and found the student speech in 
question to be protected. 144 
Taken together, this medley of cases highlights the types of 
questions that courts (and schools) ask in student speech and 
threat cases, and reveals not only a lack of cohesion from ease 
to case, but also a lack of focus on vital factors. The next part 
of this paper reflects, in the context of current advice from the 
FBI on threat assessment, on the questions that these and 
other relevant cases raise, and concludes that the current 
judicial response is less than adequate. The last part 
recommends a new direction for reviewing and analyzing 
speech claims involving students in schools. 
1. LaVine v. Blaine School District: Student Poem, Ruling for 
the SchooU 15 
,Just after the school shooting in Thurston, Oregon, James 
La Vine wrote the poem "Last Words" 146 about school shootings. 
The poem describes a school shooting that took place two years 
before, and then describes the shooter's subsequent suicidal 
plans. James showed the poem to his mother who advised him 
not to show it to anyone at school because they might 
overreact. 147 Later that year, James showed the poem to Ms. 
Bleeker, his English teacher, and asked her opinion of it. 148 
Concerned, Ms. Bleeker shared the poem with the guidance 
11:3. D.G. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12197 at 6-7 (N.D. 
Okla. 2000). 
111. While the on-premises, off-premises nature of the speech may prove 
significant in the review of school disciplinary decisions, this docs not appear to be an 
issue in the judicial review of criminal decisions. For example, in A.S., G2G N.W.2d at 
715, the threat was made off-premises about harm at school; in RT, 781 S.2d 1239, the 
thn~at was made on the premises. 
14(). 2:17 F. :3d 981. 
146. I d. at 98:3-984; see also student poem Last Words, infra. 1\ppendix I. 
147. La Vine, 257 F.:3d. at 981. 
148. lrl. 
THREATS MADE, THREATS POSED 695 
counselor, who in turn involved the vice principal. H 9 These 
school personnel met on a Saturday night to determine if 
,James intended to be at that night's school dance. Even 
though James had said he would not be attending the dance, 
they notified security to be on the alert. 150 
That night, the vice principal also contacted the Blaine 
police, who put them in touch with Washington State's Child 
Protective Services, which suggested they contact the 
Community Mental Health Crisis Line, which connected them 
with their on-call psychiatrist, Dr. Charles Dewitt. 151 On Dr. 
Dewitt's advice, the Blaine police talked to James at his home 
for evaluation purposes. 152 To police, James indicated that he 
had never written anything like this before, and that he had no 
access to weapons. 153 His mother confirmed that James had no 
access to weapons and said that she did not believe that he was 
a threat to himself or others. 154 The police reported their 
conversations to Dr. Dewitt who concluded, m [his] 
professional opinion on a more probable than not basis, based 
upon the information provided to me by the District and the 
law enforcement [officers] who had personally observed him, 
there were insufficient grounds for anyone to make a 
determination that ,James LaVine was in imminent danger of 
causing serious harm to himself and others." 155 James declined 
to submit voluntarily to a psychological evaluation, and the 
police concluded that they did not have probable cause for an 
involuntary commitment. 156 
James' background painted the picture of a troubled 
teenager. In addition to being involved in various disciplinary 
incidents at school, 157 James had also discussed suicide with 
the school counselor. 158 He had experienced difficulty with his 
family including a recent legal proceeding with his father, 159 a 
119. I d. 
!GO. Jd. at. fl8i5. 
lG I. I d. 
H52. I d. 
lG~. I d. 
IG·1. ld. 
155. I d. 
156. !d. 
lf57. !d. 
lf58. ld. at 981. 
J5!J. Jd. The incident involved .James parking his car where his father told him not 
to, the father throwing a rock at the car, and ,James calling the police. /,aVine, 279 
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recent break up with his girl friend, 160 and other discipline 
incidents at school. Two of the judges who heard the appeal to 
,James' case characterized the boy this way: "All of us who 
remember high school recognize the picture, the sort of boy 
that the vice principal in charge of discipline keeps his eye 
on."l61 
The next day, Sunday, the vice principal reported to the 
principal, who decided to "emergency expel" James, pursuant 
to a Washington regulation, because of the threatening content 
of the poem. 162 The regulation provided for an emergency 
expulsion when the "superintendent or designee has good and 
sufficient reason to believe that the student's presence poses an 
immediate and continuing danger to the student, other 
students, or school personnel, or an immediate and continuing 
threat of substantial disruption of the educational process." 163 
When the principal met with James and his father to tell 
them of the expulsion both James and his father became upset; 
James' father turned hostile, and James swore as he left the 
office. 164 The decision was then confirmed by letter, which 
described James being expelled because of a paper given to his 
English teacher that "implied extreme violence to our student 
body."165 
James appealed the principal's decision to the school board 
and to the courts. 166 During the school board proceedings, 
James' attorney negotiated with school officials for the boy's 
return to school based on James' obtaining a satisfactory 
psychological evaluation. 167 James met three times with a 
psychiatrist, who recommended at the third visit that James be 
allowed to return to school, which he did. 168 The court found 
this fact to be worth noting. Commending the school for 
allowing James to return to school rather than abandoning 
F.3d at 721. 
160. James' girlfriend's mother had reported this to the school, complaining that 
,James was stalking her daughter. La Vine, 257 F.3d at 984. 
161. ld. at 721. (Kleininski, J., Kozinski, J., & Reinjard, J., dissenting from denial 
of rehearing en bane). 
162. Wash. Admin. Code § 180-40-295; La Vine, 257 F. 3d at 986. 
163. LaVine, 257 F.3d at 986 n. 3; Wash. Admin. Code§ 180-40-295. 
164. LaVine, 257 F.3d at 986. 
165. ld. 
166. ld. 
167. ld. 
1G8. ld. 
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him, the court contrasted this response to another school's 
response in the case of Kip Kinkel. 169 After being expelled from 
school, Kinkel killed his parents and two students, and 
wounded dozens of others. 170 
The parties also negotiated in James' case that the letter to 
James from the school be rewritten to reflect the school's 
interest in safety rather than in disciplining James. 171 Despite 
these adjustments, James and his family continued to pursue 
their lawsuit against the school district, the counselor, the vice 
principal, and the principal, for damages and for an order 
requiring removal of the emergency expulsion records from 
James' files. James claimed that the expulsion and 
maintenance of negative documents in his file violated his First 
Amendment rights. 172 The district court found that the poem 
was the sole basis for the expulsion and that the poem was "not 
a sincere expression of intent to harm or assault."173 It further 
held that while a temporary suspension for a psychiatric 
169. Id. at 990 n. 7. An FBI study on school violence reached a similar conclusion: 
"It is especially important that a school not deal with threats by simply 
kicking the problem out the door. Expelling or suspending a student for 
making a threat must not be a substitute for careful threat assessment and a 
considered, consistent policy of intervention. Disciplinary action alone, 
unaccompanied by any effort to evaluate the threat or the student's intent, 
may actually exacerbate the danger-for example, if a student feels unfairly 
or arbitrarily treated and becomes even angrier and more bent on carrying 
out a violent act." 
O'Toole, supra n. 1, at 26.; see also e.g. G.S., 749 A.2d 903 (fifteen-year-old high school 
student involved with bomb threat, expelled, adjudicated delinquent, on probation, 
entitled to have state provide education in alternative setting); Require Evaluation and 
Counseling for Suspended and Expelled Students, Sch. Superintendent's Insider 1-2 
(July 2002). 
170. LaVin~<, 257 F.ad at 990 n. 7. The court cites to an article in the Portland 
Oregonian. "After Kinkel was expelled from school for having a stolen gun in his locker 
on May 20, 1998, authorities released him into the care of his father. Back at their 
home, the boy waited for William Kinkel to get off the phone with a teacher before he 
sneaked up behind his father at a kitchen counter and blasted one .22-caliber bullet 
into the back of his head" ... Kinkel left a note on the living room coffee table, saying 
his parents could not have lived with the embarrassment of his expulsion. The next 
morning, Kinkel ... drove his mother's Ford Explorer to school. Armed with a 22-
caliber rifle, a 9 mm pistol, and more than 1,000 rounds of ammunition, Kinkel fired 
more than 50 rounds before he was tackled in the cafeteria." Maxine Bernstein, dudge 
8entences Kinkel to Life Behind Bars--112 Years Portland Oregonian (Nov. 11, 1999) 
(available at 1999 WL 28274894); see also Nadya Labi, Locking Up The Voices: A Teen 
Killer is Sent Away for Life. Was dustice Done?, Time Mag. 72 (Nov. 22, 1999). 
171. LaVine, 257 F.:M at 986. 
172. !d. at 986-987. 
17:l. LaVine, 279 F.ad at 723. 
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examination was acceptable, the expulsion was not. 171 The 
district court enjoined the school from maintaining any 
negative records regarding the incident in ,James' school file. 17G 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that ,James' First 
Amendment rights were not violated. 176 Recognizing first that 
deference was to be granted to the administrators in school 
situations, and noting that this was neither lewd speech nor 
school-sponsored speech, the court followed the Tinher analysis 
to find in favor of the school. 177 In support of its decision for 
the school, the court considered the evidence of James' recent 
breakup with his girlfriend, his current difficulties with his 
father, his recent three-day absence from school, his prior 
disciplinary records (including a violent incident), 178 and most 
importantly, his own imagery of killing and suicide in "Last 
Words. "179 Against this background, and the background of 
other school shootings, the court found that the evidence was 
"sufficient to have led school authorities reasonably to forecast 
substantial disruption of, or material interference with, school 
activities-in other words, that James intended to inflict injury 
upon himself or others." 180 
Weighing the evidence, the Ninth Circuit also found the 
difference between the more stringent standard for involuntary 
commitment and the standard the school would have to meet to 
be particularly persuasive. 181 This, coupled with the deference 
that the court typically gives the school board, led the court to 
174. ld. 
175. Jd. at 722. 
176. Lo Vine, 257 F.ad at 989. 
177. Id. 
178. !d. at 989--990. 
179. !d. at 990. The coupling of threats to others with suicidal behavior is, of 
course. reminiscent of the actual shootings at Columbine where twelve people were 
killed before the student killers also killed them~elves. The Columbine killers did hnve 
a known history of threatening behavior. Both had previous legal issues for breaking 
into a car and stealing tools. They also had a website that revealed the rage the two 
felt towards Columbine classmates and their desire for revenge. Additionally, Eric 
Harris suffered from depression and obsessive-compulsive disorder and was preseribed 
Luvox, an anti-depressant. See Allison Sherry, JJrng Firm Sued 01Jer Columbine; Kin 
Target Antidepressont Used by Harris Denver Post B02 (Oct. 21, 200 l) (available at 
2001 WL 27669461). See generally McKinney, supra n. a, at J:l48-t::H9 and examples 
cited therein at nn. 144--155. 
180. LoVine, 257 F.:ld at 990. 
181. ld. ("'ndeed, because of the special circumstances of the school environment, 
ihe level of disturbance required to justify official intervention is lower inside a public 
school than it is outside the schooL"). 
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dec:ide for the school on First Amendment grounds in what it 
described as a close case. 182 Although the school also raised a 
true threat exception argument to First Amendment 
protection, having already decided in favor of the school under 
the disruption standard, the c:ourt did not reach the 
::tpplicability of the true threat exception. 
The Ninth Circuit did agree with James that the "negative 
documentation" of the incident should be removed from his files 
and, thus, affirmed the injunction against the school. Calling 
this a "permanent indictment," the court acknowledged the 
initial need for documentation, but found no such need "after 
the perceived threat had subsided, the school had allowed 
,James to return to classes and had satisfied itself that James 
was not a threat to himself or others."ts:J 
2. Lovell v. Poway Unified School District: Student Threat to 
Counselor, Ruling for the Sclwol 1il4 
LoPell involved a threat made by a high school student, 
Sarah Lovell, to a school counselor, Linda Suokko, for which 
the student was suspended for three days.l 85 The incident in 
question occurred after Sarah had spent a difficult day being 
shuffled for hours between the guidance office and other 
administrative offices as she attempted to change her class 
schedule. 186 At the last stage in the process, the guidance 
counselor told Sarah that she was not sure if the change could 
be made, and Sarah lost control. According to Sarah, she told 
Suokko, "I'm so angry, I could just shoot someone." 187 Suokko's 
story was that Sarah said, "If you don't give me this schedule 
change, I'm going to shoot you!" According to the counselor, 
when she replied that she was not used to "having people 
walking into my office and telling me they're going to shoot 
me," Sarah responded, "I'm so angry I could shoot someone." 18il 
Sarah apologized, the class change was made, and Sarah left_lllCJ 
lil2. This close and hard-argued case produced a strongly divided court. See 
LoVine, 279 F.ad 719 (opinion on denial of reconsideration). 
lila. La v,:ne, 21>7 F.:ld at 991-992. 
IR4. 90 ~·_:ld aG7 (~Jth Cir. 199G). 
I 85. Irl. at :IG9 _ 
lilG. !d. 
187. !d. 
!88. !d. at :~G9 n. I. 
I il!J. I d. at :~69. 
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Later that day, the counselor reported the incident to the 
assistant principal, explaining that she felt threatened and was 
"concerned about some future reprisal." 190 The relevant section 
of Suokko's student office referral stated: 
When Sarah entered my counseling office, after seeing 
Scott Wright, Sarah stated," ... ifyou don't give me this 
schedule change, I'm going to shoot you!" I believe that 
the tone and manner conveyed by Sarah Lovell 
demonstrates possible future danger. I have witnessed 
Sarah's volatile nature, poor and lack of impulse control, 
and possible violent verbal tendencies. I am extremely 
concerned about Sarah's potentially explosive 
behavior. 191 
At a meeting with the assistant principal and Sarah, 
Suokko described Sarah as "angry, serious and emotionally out 
of control when the statement was made."192 After a meeting 
with Sarah and her parents, the assistant principal suspended 
Sarah for three days. 193 Initially, Sarah's parents intended to 
accept the suspension, but when they read the discipline 
referral form, they asked to have it removed from Sarah's file. 
When the school rejected their request, the Lovells challenged 
the school's actions in a lawsuit, alleging violation of Sarah's 
free speech and due process rights. 194 The magistrate who 
heard the testimony could not determine whether Sarah's or 
Suokko's version of what happened was more credible. 195 On 
the free speech claim, the district court held for the student. 
Using a true threat analysis, the Ninth Circuit, reviewed the 
question of law de novo and the factual findings under a clearly 
erroneous standard, and reversed the trial court's decision. The 
court ultimately sided with Suokko's version and specifically 
found that threats like this one were constitutionally 
unprotected under both federal and state law .196 
190. ld. 
191. ld. at 370 n. 2 
192. ld. at 369. 
193. ld. 
194. ld. at ~no. 
195. ld. at B69, 373 n. 6. 
196. ld. at 371. Lovell's speech claims were brought under both federal and stale 
laws, and the case raised issues whether they were the same, and should be reviewed 
under the same standard, since by statute, California provides that students' speech 
rights in school should be the same on-campus as off-campus. See Lovell, 90 F.3d at 
374 (Noonan, ,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See also Cal. Educ. Code § 
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Following a true threat analysis, the court defined the 
question as whether a reasonable person in Sarah's position 
would have foreseen that the guidance counselor would have 
perceived her remarks to be threatening.197 
Considering only Suokko's version of the facts for a 
moment, there is no question that any person could 
reasonably consider the statement "If you don't give me 
this schedule change, I'm going to shoot you," made by 
an angry teenager, to be a serious expression of intent 
to harm or assault. A reasonable person in these 
circumstances would have foreseen that Suokko would 
interpret that statement as a serious expression of 
intent to harm. This statement is unequivocal and 
specific enough to convey a true threat of physical 
violence. This is particularly true when considered 
against the backdrop of increasing violence among 
school children today. Furthermore, when considering 
the surrounding factual context, the magistrate judge 
focused too much on the actions taken or not taken by 
Suokko following Lovell's. 198 
The Ninth Circuit carefully reviewed both versions of the 
remarks, 199 and easily found that in the counselor's version, 
Sarah's comments constituted a true threat. Because of the 
disputed evidence, however, the Ninth Circuit did not come to 
the same conclusion regarding Sarah's version of the remarks. 
The court noted, "When they are frustrated, people do utter 
expressions such as, 'I'm so frustrated I could just shoot 
someone.' It is not clear that one should foresee that such a 
statement will be interpreted as a serious expression of intent 
to harm." However, given the state of school violence today, 200 
and given the applicable burdens of proof and persuasion, 
Sarah did not prevail on this point. 201 
48950 (2008). 
197. Lovell, 90 F.3d at 872. 
198. Id. at 372-373 (paragraphing deleted). 
199. /d. at 373. 
200. Id. at 374. 
201. Compare Lovell, 90 F.8d 367 (civil case) with In re Ricky T., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
165 (criminal case; "I'm going to get you" not sufficient for adjudication of delinquency 
under California terrorist threatening statute); J.H., 797 A.2d 260 (criminal case; "last 
thing you'll ever do"-is basis for violation of terroristic threatening statute). 
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3. D.G. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 11: Poem "Killmg Mrs. 
{Teacher}," Ruling for the Student202 
D.O. illustrates the use of both a Tinker-type analysis and a 
true threat analysis. 208 In D.O., there were some "bad feelings" 
between the student and teacher from a prior year. At the time 
of the incident, the eleventh-grade student was enrolled for a 
second time in the teacher's class and found it frustrating. 204 
The spark for this particular confrontation arose when the 
teacher asked the student to move to a different part of the 
classroom because the student was talking. The student 
thought she was "wrongly accused" and wrote a poem entitled 
Killing Mrs. [Teacher]. zo5 
The student and her close friend discussed the poem. The 
friend, during the same class, had drawn some stick figures 
showing the teacher hanging on a gallows with several smaller 
stick figures at the bottom. Both pieces of paper, the poem and 
the drawing, were in the friend's backpack. They were 
subsequently found on the floor in another classroom and sent 
to the assistant principal.2°6 The assistant principal met with 
the student and allowed her to return to class; however, later 
that day, the student was suspended for the remainder of the 
school year and the first semester of the following year under 
the school's zero tolerance policy. The suspension was initially 
to an in-house, alternative program called Oasis, where the 
student is allowed to attend school, but must complete 
assignments in an area separate from other students. 207 In 
response to the school's actions, the student and her parents 
sought preliminary and permanent injunctions, raising a civil 
rights claim on First Amendment grounds. 
The Oklahoma District Court cited first to "the trilogy" of 
student speech cases, and then discussed the true threat 
doctrine. In the true threat context the court applied an 
objective test that focused on the speaker - in other words, 
"whether a reasonable person would foresee that the statement 
would be interpreted by those to whom the maker 
202. D.G., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12197, at 1. 
203. See also C. C. H., 6S 1 N.W.2d 702 (using both analyses in a criminal case). 
204. D.G., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12197, at 2, 4. 
205. The poem is included in Appendix 1. 
206. D. G., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEX IS 12197, at 1. 
207. ld. at 6-R (later changed to an out-of-school suspension order). 
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communicates the statement as a serious expression of intent 
to harm or assault."208 The court then augmented its focus on 
the speaker by also considering "the entire factual context, 
including the surrounding events and the reaction of the 
listeners." 209 The parties agreed that the student did not intend 
the poem as a threat and that the parties did not themselves 
consider it a genuine threat.~ 10 Likewise, the consulting 
psychologist did not find that the student intended for the 
poem to be threatening, but was only a means of venting 
frustration. 211 The consulting psychologist also reported that 
the student "did not appear to have a history of violence or the 
personality that would express its anger in violent actions."212 
Finding that the student did not intend for the teacher to 
see the poem, and that it was not a true threat, the court then 
returned to the disruption standard. 218 Reflecting on the effect 
of a zero tolerance policy in relationship to the Tinker 
standard, the court observed that it is "impossible to have a 'no 
tolerance' policy against 'threats' if the threats involve 
speech."211 In these instances, a zero tolerance policy must give 
way to Free Speech considerations: "A student cannot be 
penalized for what they are thinking. If those thoughts are 
then expressed in speech, the ability of the school to censor or 
punish the speech will be determined by whether it was (1) a 
"true" or "genuine" threat, or (2) disruptive of the normal 
operation of the school."215 Against this standard, the court 
found no true threat and no substantial disruption sufficient to 
support a suspension. 
Lovell, LaVine, and D.G. are all civil cases, which deal with 
students who were troubled in different ways and degrees, and 
who had been disciplined at school for their speech. The 
criminal cases take disciplinary action away from the schools, 
and thrust it directly into the criminal justice system. Like the 
civil cases, the cases arising in the criminal context are 
illustrative both as to their fact patterns and as to their legal 
208. ld. at 12 (citing U.S. u. Orozco-Santillan, 90:i F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
209. /d. 
:no. !d. at t:l-14. 
211. ld.atl4. 
212. !d. at J:l-H. 
n:~. ld. at 14-15. 
214. !d. at 15-lG. 
2!5. ld. at Iii. 
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analysis. At least six state supreme courts have reviewed 
questions related to threatening student speech and related 
violations of state criminal law.216 In these cases, the courts 
have explored the contours of the true threat doctrine as they 
attempt to narrowly construe state criminal statutes in a way 
that will withstand First Amendment scrutiny. 217 Often, courts 
have to decide whether the threat was real or merely talking, 
trash talking, joking, or a manifestation of frustration. As one 
California juvenile delinquency decision put it: 
It is this court's opinion that section 422218 was not 
enacted to punish an angry adolescent's utterances, 
unless they otherwise qualify as terrorist threats under 
that statute. Appellant's statement was an emotional 
response to an accident rather than a death threat that 
induced sustained fear. Although what appellant did 
was wrong, we are hesitant to change this school 
confrontation between a student and a teacher to a 
terrorist threat. Students that misbehave should be 
taught a lesson, but not, as in this case, a penal one. 219 
Noticing the frustration, and the expressions of violence 
that often accompany it, the South Dakota Supreme Court put 
it this way: 
Hostility and competition among our youth is natural. 
It happens m competitive sports; it happens m 
216. Jones, 64 S.W.3d 728; RT, 781 S.2d 1239; Milo M., 740 N.E. 2d 967; St. u. 
McCooey, 802 A.2d 1216; C.C.H., 651 N.W.2d 702; A.S., 626 N.W.2d 712; Douglas D., 
626 N.W.2d 725. Four states have considered the First Amendment in these contexts, 
Arkansas, Louisiana, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. Because state criminal statutes 
differ from each other, generalizing is difficult. '!'his article reviews the larger 
constitutional questions, but does not focus on statutory interpretation in the context of 
individual states. 
217. E.g. Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725; In re Kyle M., 27 P.3d 804, 808 (2001). 
218. California Penal Code section 422 (West 1999), provides: 
Any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result in 
death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that 
the statement, made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic 
communication device, is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of 
actually carrying it out, which, on its face and under the circumstances in 
which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as 
to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate 
prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby causes that person 
reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her 
immediate family's safety, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county 
jail not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison. 
219. In re Ricky T., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171-172. See also In re: lnJ?mar C., 2001 
Cal. App. LEXIS 601 at 58 (student drawings hanging teacher not criminal). 
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adolescent love affairs; it happens among siblings; it is 
an inevitable part of growing up. Many of the unkind 
words that stem from this hostility and competition may 
cause others uneasiness, but most of the words are 
protected by the First Amendment. 
705 
In our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of 
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to 
freedom of expression. Any departure from absolute 
regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from 
the majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any word 
spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, 
that deviates from the views of another person may 
start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our 
Constitution says we must take this risk; and our 
history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom-
this kind of openness-that is the basis of our national 
strength and of the independence and vigor of 
Americans who grow up and live in this relatively 
permissive, often disputatious, society. 220 
Given the need to discern between intent to threaten and 
intent to merely jest or talk big, two cases decided by the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, In re: A.S. and In re: Douglas D., 
provide illustrative case law in the criminal context. 221 
220. C.C.H., 651 N.W.2d at 707-708. 
221. In re A.S., 626 N.W.2d 712; In re Dougla.s D., 626 N.W.2d 725. Cases from 
other state supreme courts provide similar analysis and results. For example, the 
Arkansas Supreme Court addressed threatening speech in Jones, 64 S. W.3d 728. Jones 
involved a criminal prosecution for terroristic threatening made by Blake Jones, a 
fifteen-year-old high school student, against Allison Arnold, also a fifteen-year-old high 
school student. The two students had been friends, Allison describing herself as 
wanting to give Blake hope. Allison had written to Blake while he was in juvenile 
detention, and Blake had shared some of his rap compositions with her. At one point 
at school, Allison refused to write notes to Blake during class. Blake later testified that 
he felt Allison was being "snobby towards him." In response, he then wrote a violent, 
threatening rap song and gave it to her. Blake claimed that he told Allison not to take 
the song seriously, but she denied this. Frightened, Allison took the song to the 
principal who called the police. During the police interview, Blake said he did not 
"understand why everyone was upset," offered to apologize, and admitted that he wrote 
the song "to get his feelings out." Blake later said in a written statement to the police, 
"I got mad and wrote a letter to express myself. It was a rap and pretty gruesome." 
Principal Wesson testified that Blake seemed to have no understanding that his 
writing could frighten or harm another person. Blake was charged under Arkansas law 
with terroristic threatening, a Class D felony, and adjudicated delinquent. The 
sentence was twenty-four months supervised probation plus seven days at the state's 
youth detention facility. 
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1. In re: A.S.: Threats Made at Yoc-lth Center Regarding Killing 
at Middle School, Ruling for the State~22 
Thirteen-year-old A.S. was charged with disorderly conduct, 
based on a report to the local police made by another juvenile, 
A.H. A.B. reported that, at the local youth center, A.S. had 
threatened to "kill everyone at the middle school" in a shooting 
similar to Columbine. A.B. reported specific threats about a 
police officer, the assistant principal, and a social studies 
teacher, as well as a threat to rape M.P. who was a fellow 
student. A.H. indicated that A.S. was not laughing when he 
said these things. Other juveniles interviewed by the police 
confirmed A.B.'s statements. A.H. and M.L., another student 
who was present at the youth center at the time, reported that 
they were frightened by A.S's statements. M.L. reported that 
she told A.S. that she was frightened.zz:3 When the police 
interviewed him, A.S. admitted that he said "I'm going to take 
over the school like in Colorado," and made specific remarks 
about shooting the assistant principal after holding him down 
and having him count to ten, about raping M.P., and about 
hanging Officer O'Neill by her wrists, breaking her arms and 
legs, and then shooting her. 221 
Based on his statements to others at the youth center, A.S. 
was charged under the Wisconsin statute that provides: 
"Whoever, in a public or private place, engages in violent, 
abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud or 
otherwise disorderly conduct under circumstances in which the 
conduct tends to cause or provoke a disturbance is guilty of a 
Class B misdemeanor."225 The Wisconsin circuit court 
dismissed the delinquency petition as without sufficient basis, 
finding A.S.'s comments to be "an extreme level of adolescent 
'trash talking,' which produced no immediate disorder." 226 On 
appeal, the Wisconsin appellate court reversed. The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court found that the disorderly conduct statute can 
apply to "speech alone" in appropriate circumstances,227 and 
222. In rc A.S., 626 N.W.2d 712. See also Dennis Chaptman, Court Sets Student 
SpePch Limits, Milwa ukce Journal Sentinel, I A (May 17. 200 1). 
223. In re A.S., 626 N.W.2d at 715. 
224. ld. at 716. 
225. WIST 947.01 (1!!96). 
226. In re AS., 626 N.W.2d at 716. 
227. Here the Court observed that the regulation is directed not at the speech itself 
(speech unaccompanied by action and not unduly loud), but at the "harmful effects of 
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went on to consider whether A.S.'s speech was otherwise 
protected by the First Amendment228 and whether the 
disorderly conduct standard had been met by the facts of this 
case. 
In addressing whether A.S.'s speech was otherwise 
protected by the First Amendment, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court engaged in a true threat analysis to determine if the 
speech would be protected by the First Amendment, and thus 
not subject to the criminal statute. The court used the 
following definition of a true threat229 that focused first on the 
speaker:230 
a speaker would reasonably foresee 
that a listener would reasonably interpret as a serious 
expression of purpose to inflict harm, as distinguished 
from hyperbole, jest, innocuous talk, expressions of 
political views, or other similarly protected speech. 
It is not necessary that the speaker have the ability to 
carry out the threat. 
In determining whether a statement is a true threat, 
the totality of the circumstances must be considered. 231 
the speech." Id. at 718. 
228. Id. at 719. 
229. A.S. attempted to make a Brandenburg argument that the "mere advocacy" of 
violence was protected if it did not incite violence, but the court found the Watts true 
threat analysis more applicable. Id. 
230. Other state supreme courts have used similar though not identical tests. For 
example, in the Jones case discussed previously, the Arkansas Supreme Court found 
the speech to be a true threat and unprotected under the Constitution. The Arkansas 
Supreme Court reviewed the various formulations of the true threat tests and reached 
a result similar to that of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in A.S. and Douglas D, but 
more focused on the listener. The Arkansas court used "an objective test focusing on 
how a reasonable person would have taken the statement" plus the five factors 
developed in the Eighth Circuit: 1) the reaction of the recipient of the threat and of 
other listeners; 2) whether the threat was conditional; 3) whether the threat was 
communicated directly to its victim; 4) whether the maker of the threat had made 
similar statements to the victim in the past; and 5) whether the victim had reason to 
believe that the maker of the threat had a propensity to engage in violence." Applying 
this test to the facts in Jones, the Court ftrst noted that Allison had reacted 
immediately, telling the principal and police officer that she was very frightened and 
that she "believed Jones was capable of carrying out the threat because he had a 
criminal record and knew where her family lived." Similarly, the Court found that the 
threat was unconditional and was given directly to Allison. Under these 
circumstances, "a reasonable person in Arnold's position would have taken the rap song 
as a true threat." 
231. ln re A.S., 626 N.W.2d at 720, see also Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d at 739-740 
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According to the court, surrounding circumstances include 
such factors as, 
How the recipient and other listeners reacted to the 
alleged threat, 
Whether the threat was conditional, 
Whether it was communicated directly to its victim, 
Whether the maker of the threat had made similar 
statements to the victim on other occasions, and 
Whether the victim had reason to believe that the 
maker of the threat had a propensity to engage in 
violence. 232 
In A.S.'s favor, the court weighed his age and relative 
immaturity, and the fact that the threats were not made 
directly to any of the people that he specifically mentioned in 
his statement. On the other side, the court referred to A.S.'s 
non-joking demeanor, to the fact that M.L. told A.S. that his 
remarks frightened her, and to A.S.'s references to Columbine. 
Based on this record, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded 
that A.S.'s remarks were not jokes or hyperbole, but true 
threats and that the petition was sufficient to show probable 
cause on the disorderly conduct charge for abusive and 
"otherwise disorderly" conduct. 233 The court also found that 
A.S.'s speech was "of the type that tends to cause or provoke a 
disturbance under the circumstances as they then existed." 
Noting again the post-Columbine atmosphere and the response 
of the students who heard the threats, the court found this 
element of the charge also adequately alleged.234 
(paragraphing and emphasis supplied). 
232. In re A.S., 626 N.W.2d at 720 (paragraphing supplied), see also Douglas D., 
626 N. W.2d at 7 40. For a general discussion of the speaker/listener test see Rothman, 
supra n. 81, at 284. 
233. In re A.S., 626 N.W.2d 721, 722, 723. 
234. Id. at 723. 
663] THREATS MADE, THREATS POSED 709 
5. In re Douglas D.: Threatening Composition, Ruling for the 
Student on the Criminal Offense235 
In Douglas D., an eighth grade student was charged with 
disorderly conduct and adjudicated delinquent under the same 
Wisconsin criminal statute at issue in A.S. 
Douglas raised the First Amendment to defend his eighth 
grade creative writing assignment. The assignment was for an 
in-class writing to be entitled "Top Secret." Each student's 
work was to be part of a continuing story; Douglas was to write 
the first part, and three other students would finish the story. 
There were no other stated requirements. Douglas did not 
focus on the assignment, but instead talked and disrupted the 
class. To avoid further interruption of the class, Douglas' 
teacher, Mrs. C., told him to work in the hallway. At the end of 
the class period, he turned in this essay: 
There one lived an old ugly woman her name was Mrs. 
C that stood for crab. She was a mean old woman that 
would beat children sencless. I guess that's why she 
became a teacher. Well one day she kick a student out 
of her class & he din't like it. That student was named 
Dick. The next morning Dick came to class & in his coat 
he conseled a machedy. When the teacher told him to 
shut up he w hiped it out & cut her head off. When the 
sub came 2 days later she needed a paperclipp so she 
opened the droor. Ahh she screamed as she found Mrs. 
C.'s head in the droor.''236 
The teacher perceived this paper to be a threat to her, and 
reported it to the assistant principal immediately after class. 
When interviewed by the principal, Douglas apologized and 
said the story was not meant to be a threat. Douglas served an 
in-school suspension and then returned to a different English 
class. Simultaneously, the police filed a delinquency petition 
against Douglas, alleging that by submitting a "death threat" 
to Mrs. C., he had engaged in unlawful disorderly conduct, that 
was "abusive conduct under circumstances in which the 
conduct tends to cause a disturbance."237 The student was 
adjudicated delinquent for this disorderly conduct by the trial 
court, and the decision was affirmed by the appeals court. 
235. In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725. 
236. Id. no-731. 
237. ld. at 7:{1. 
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In a constitutional challenge,238 the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, in a six to one decision, found the statute to be neither 
overly broad nor under inclusive. 239 The Wisconsin court 
reasoned that Douglas could be convicted under this statute 
even if his wrongdoing was "purely written speech,"240 and even 
if the conduct was not actually disturbing; it is punishable so 
long as the conduct is "the type of conduct that tends to disturb 
others."241 However, for the statute to be constitutionally 
applied to Douglas, the contested speech must be outside the 
protection of the First Amendment-in other words, a true 
threat. 
As in A.S., the standard enunciated for true threat analysis 
was that "in light of all the surrounding circumstances, a 
speaker would reasonably foresee that a listener would 
reasonably interpret as a serious expression of a purpose to 
inflict harm, as distinguished from hyperbole, jest, innocuous 
talk, expressions of political views, or other similarly protected 
speech. It is not necessary that the speaker have the ability to 
carry out the threat."242 
Against this standard, the court noted that Douglas 
conveyed his story to the teacher and that the teacher said she 
was frightened. On the other side of the issue, the court noted 
that there was no evidence that Mrs. C. had been threatened in 
the past, or that she had reason to believe that Douglas had "a 
propensity to engage in violence."243 In the context of an 
assignment in a creative writing class, Douglas' story did not 
constitute a true threat: 244 a thirteen-year-old boy's 
impetuous writings do not necessarily fall from First 
Amendment protection due to their offensive nature." 245 
238. Douglas claimed that the delinquency adjudication based on his story is a 
violation of his First Amendment rights and that the Wisconsin statute could not be 
properly construed to apply "purely written speech." Id. at 731. 
239. ld. at 734. 
240. ld. at 736. 
211. /d. at 738. The court finds that threatening a teacher at school is exactly such 
an offense. Citing at length from statistics and reports dealing with the prevalence of 
school violence, the Court states, "With this in mind, we cannot imagine how a student 
threatening a teacher could not be deemed conduct that tends to menace, disrupt, or 
destroy public order," regardless of whether the speech actually caused a disturbance. 
Jd. at 7a7-738. 
242. ld. at 739-740. See also Milo M., 740 N.E.2d 967. 
243. In re: Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d at 741. 
214. Id. 
245. Id. 
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Accordingly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded as a 
matter of law that Douglas' essay about killing a teacher with a 
machete could not properly be prosecuted under the criminal 
disorderly conduct statute. 246 
The court took pains to point out that this did not mean 
that Douglas could not be disciplined by the school: 
By no means should schools interpret this holding as 
undermining their authority to utilize their internal 
disciplinary procedures to punish speech such as 
Douglas's story. Although the First Amendment 
prohibits law enforcement officials from prosecuting 
protected speech, it does not necessarily follow that 
schools may not discipline students for such speech. 247 
In the context of school discipline, the court applied the 
analysis from the Supreme Court's school speech "trilogy," 
noting that in some instances, schools may discipline students 
where law enforcement would not be able to do so 
constitutionally. The court found that in such circumstances as 
existed here, apparently using the Hazelwood reasoning for the 
school's ability to apply standards for in-school speech, 
"[a]lthough the story is not a true threat, it is an offensive, 
crass insult to Mrs. C. Schools need not tolerate this type of 
assault to the sensibilities of their educators or students."248 
In a majority of these cases, the courts and schools have 
found it difficult to identify the line between threat and jest, 
and threat and a cry for help. The judicial analysis, while 
sometimes talking in terms of distinguishing jest from threat, 
seems nevertheless to miss the necessary factors and thus fails 
to focus on the difference between making and posing a threat. 
The next part of this paper discusses the FBI's view of 
assessment of students' statements in these troubling 
situations, and proposes some new direction for analysis. 
246. Id. at 742. 
247. ld. at 742. See olsu Crooks, N. Patrick, concurring, id. at 748. 
218. ld. at 74:3 (court cites here to Justice Black's dissent in Tinker). But see id. at 
759 (Prosser, J., dissenting). See also Sandy Banks, A Missed Lesson in Limits of Vile 
Speech, L.A. Times, Part 5, 1 (Mar. 19, 2002) (teacher 4.6 million dollar verdict in 
hostile environment harassment suit against school for rogue student newspaper re: 
teacher porn star, pornography). 
712 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2003 
PART 4. THREAT AsSESSMENT 
In the wake of the school shootings that so shocked the 
country, the Department of Education, the Secret Service, and 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (collectively, "the FBI") 
studied the circumstances surrounding the shootings in an 
effort to provide future guidance for threat assessment. 249 
While the FBI studies revealed no single profile, they did 
identify some common attributes among the students who 
commit targeted violence that suggest a call for heightened 
sensitivity regarding student speech. First, 17 percent of the 
school shooters directly threatened their specific targets. 250 
Second, many had shown an inability to cope with significant 
personal loss or failure, and almost all had suffered some sort 
of loss before the incident.251 Third, seventy-eight percent had 
previously threatened or attempted suicide. 252 Finally, 
regardless of whether the students made direct threats or not, 
the incidents were planned, and were often known to someone 
else ahead of time. The FBI found that this "leakage" of 
information occurs in the form of "subtle threats, boasts, 
innuendos, predictions, or ultimatums" in "stories, diary 
entries, essays, poems, letters, songs, drawings, doodles, 
tattoos or videos." 253 These "spoken" clues necessitate careful 
response; and in many instances since Columbine, such careful 
responses have successfully foiled intended school killings. 254 
249. The studies focused on thirty-seven identified incidents of school shootings 
from 1974~2000. See O'Toole, supra. n. 1. See also Bill Dedman, Examining the Psyche 
of an Adolescent Killer, Chi. Sun Times (Oct. 15, 2000); Anthony Chase, Violent 
Reaction-What Do Teen Killers Have In Common? In These Times, 25 (,July 9, 2001); 
Meloy, J. Reid et al., Offender and Offense Characteristics of a Nonrandom Sample of 
Adolescent Mass Murderers, 40 J. of the Am. Acad. of Child and Adolescent Psych. 719 
(June 2001). 
250. Vossekuil et al., supra. n. 3 at 18, 30. 
251. ld. at 18, 27. Major losses included loss of loved one including romantic 
relationship, major illness, being fired. One of the school shootings involved a student 
who was laid off because he did not have a high school diploma. The student blamed 
the teacher who had failed him in a course his senior year. After being laid off, he 
killed that teacher and two students, holding six others hostage for ten hours. Many 
also had been the victims of bullying or injury by others. See also Michael S. Dorn & 
Brian Doss, Handling Bomb Threats 2 (LRP Pub. 2002). 
252. Only 34 percent had been evaluated or diagnosed with mental disorders. 
Vossekuil et al., supra n. 3 at 25. 
253. O'Toole, supra n. 1, at 16. 
254. See generally Bower, supra n. 14 (reviewing foiled attempts). 
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The FBI reports emphasize that threat assessment needs to 
focus on whether a student actually poses a threat, not on 
whether a student makes a threat.255 The ability to make this 
distinction requires a focus on student behavior. The reports 
also indicate that "the person, the situation, the setting, and 
the target" should all be considered256 as part of a four-pronged 
analysis of the student's personality, family dynamics, school 
dynamics, and social dynamics. 257 Specifically, effective threat 
assessment needs to address258 the student's 
• Family/home situation, including present 
stability; 
• Academic performance; 
• Social networks; 
• History of relationships and conflicts; 
• History of harassing others or of being harassed 
by others; 
• History of violence toward self and others; 
• History of having been a victim of violence or 
bullying; 
• Known attitudes toward violence; 
• Criminal behavior; 
• Mental health/substance abuse history;259 
• Access to and use of weapons; 
• History of grievances and grudges; 
• Nature and quality of current relationships and 
personal support; 
255. O'Toole, supra n. 1, at 25. 
256. ld. at 12, 36. 
257. ld. at 10. 
258. ld. at 59-60. 
259. See also National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, Youth Violence Linked to 
Substance Use (Washington, DC Nov. 2001) ("Youths who reported participating in 
violence during the past year were more likely to use alcohol and illicit drugs during 
the past month than youths who did not report past year violence.") (available at 
<http://www.samhsa.gov/oas/2k2/YouthViol/YouthVioLhtm>) (accessed July 16, 2002). 
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• Recent losses or losses of status (shame, 
humiliation, recent breakup or loss of significant 
relationship); 
• Current grievances or grudges; 
• Perceptions of being treated unfairly; 
• Known difficulty coping with a stressful event(s); 
• Any "downward" progression in social, academic, 
behavioral, or psychological functioning; 
• Recent hopelessness, desperation, and/or despair, 
including suicidal thoughts, gestures, actions, or 
attempts; and 
• Pending crises or changes in circumstances. 
In addition to developing a profile of the student's personal 
life, the FBI report also focuses on school dynamics and 
recommends a similar line of inquiry regarding information 
that is specifically available at school. The school analysis 
should consider the following questions: 
• Is the student well known to any adult at the 
school? 
• Has the student come to attention for any 
behavior of concern? If so, what (e-mail, website, 
posters, papers, rule-breaking, violence, 
harassment, adjustment problems, depression or 
despair, acting-out behavior, etc.)? 
• Has the student experienced serious difficulties 
or been in distress? Is there anyone with whom 
the student shares worries, frustrations, and/or 
sorrows? 
• Is there information that the student has 
considered ending his or her life? 
• Has the student been a victim and/or an initiator 
of hostile, harassing, or bullying behavior 
directed toward other students, teachers, or 
other staff? 
• Is the student known to have an interest m 
weapons? If so, has he or she made efforts to 
acquire or use weapons? Does the student live in 
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a home where there are weapons (whether or not 
the weapons are secured)?260 
715 
Of particular note is the FBI's position on the relative value 
of interviews of others in assessing threats. The FBI finds 
value in consideration of whether the student has any strong 
relationship with adults who might have useful information. 261 
While other collateral interviews are recommended to gain 
information, it is only with the caution that credence not be 
given to answers when others are asked to "characterize the 
student or interpret meanings of communications that the 
student may have made." The FBI has found from its data that 
conclusions like "I think he's really dangerous" or "he said it 
with a smile, so I knew that he must be joking" are not 
accurate and may be misleading in assessing real threats.262 
The FBI analysis and recommended approach to threat 
assessment provides an insightful backdrop for review of the 
emerging case law on threatening student speech. When 
viewed through the lens of the FBI's threat assessment 
recommendations, the analysis and results of student speech 
cases are disturbingly incomplete. 
Comparing La Vine to Lovell, in La Vine the court looked at 
external circumstances in the student's life beyond the context 
of his speech, while in Lovell, it did not. Specifically in La Vine, 
the court took into account that La Vine was recognized by the 
school as a student with known suicidal tendencies, and he had 
also recently experienced serious losses. Furthermore, the 
school's and the courts' method of analysis, as well as their 
results, are consistent with recommendations in FBI reports. 
The court considered, and included in its opinion, many 
external factors, such as the fact that James had previously 
spoken to the school counselor of suicide, that he had a 
discipline record including one incident of violence and one of 
insubordination, that he had recently had a confrontation with 
his father serious enough for James to call the police and result 
in James' temporarily living with his sister, and he had 
recently broken up with his girlfriend. The fact that James 
had written the poem the previous summer when school 
260. ld. at 63. 
261. ld. at 60. 
262. ld. at 64. See a.lso Timothy Egan, Santee is Latest Blow to Myth of Suburbia's 
Safer Schools, N.Y. Times Al (Mar. 9, 2001); Chris Moran & Karen Kucher, Teens 
Caught Between Loyalty and Disclosure, S.D. Union-Trib. A 7 (Mar. 6, 2001). 
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shootings were prominent in the news and showed it to his 
teacher in early October, perhaps, suggested planning. On the 
other side, there was no indication that James had been 
himself victimized or the subject of bullying at schooL The vice 
principal described him as "a good kid, but ... somewhat of a 
'loner."' 263 In response to police questioning, James told 
authorities he often wrote poetry, had no particular 
explanation for why he wrote this one, and had no access to 
weapons. James' mother confirmed this. The police found no 
reason to commit James, and the consulting psychiatrist 
concluded similarly. Overall, if the analysis had been one of 
threat assessment, rather than disruption, the same result 
would have been supported. That is, if the FBI-type threat 
assessment were part of the likelihood of substantial disruption 
analysis, James' speech still would not have been protected. 
Whether the threat assessment would have led to the same 
actual result in terms of evaluation and expulsion is less 
clear.264 
By comparison, Lovell does not conform to the threat 
assessment analysis that the FBI reports would seem to 
recommend. In this case, there is simply no discussion of 
Sarah's background in terms of her personality, family, school, 
or social situation. Similarly, there is no discussion of suicidal 
tendencies or recent losses, no discussion of the existence of a 
history of violence or mental health problems, no discussion of 
possible access to weapons. Instead, the court focused only on 
the content and context of the present, current threat, and the 
perception of the person threatened. As such, the court relied 
solely on the factors and perceptions that the FBI found least 
reliable in terms of assessing whether the student actually 
poses a threat, and ignored the recommendation to consider the 
student's specific circumstances. 265 Had the court appropriately 
268. La Vine, 257 F.8d. at 985. 
264. The justices who dissented from the en bane refusal to reconsider make the 
point that the school's response was one of punishment, which in their view was an 
unconstitutional response, though they do support the suspension for psychiatric 
evaluation. La Vine, 279 F.3d at 723. The Mortimer case, 542 S.E.2d 880 (discussed 
supra at n. 110), also tracks the FBI questions fairly well. 
265. The district court opinion reversed here actually focused more on some of the 
other factors that the FBI has identified, "The Court simply did not feel that there was 
the gravity of purpose and likelihood of execution, nor the intent to harm or assault to 
allow the imposition of discipline by way of suspension in this case. This decision is 
based upon the entire factual context in which the disputed statement was made by 
Sarah Lovell, including that fact that Sarah Lovell had spoken with Linda Suokko 
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weighed these factors in the balance, the result in Lovell might 
well have been different for Sarah. In other words, the Lovell 
opinion's analysis was more concerned with whether a threat 
was made, rather than whether one was posed. D.O. and 
several other discipline cases that are similar to Lovell, also 
focus primarily on the context of the student speech, and 
others' response to that speech.266 
The sample cases in the criminal context are similar in 
their lack of focus on whether or not a threat was actually 
posed. Throughout these opinions, the categories of concern 
identified by the FBI-student's personality, family, social, and 
school dynamics-were generally ignored. Arguably, had the 
information relevant to the FBI-type of analysis been 
considered, Douglas D.'s story would have been found to be a 
true threat and been responded to as such. Instead, in the 
context of the factors that it considered, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court emphasized the fact that the speech was 
expressed in the framework of a creative writing assignment, 
without comparing this to the findings of a full examination of 
possible real-life consequences. 267 Interestingly, the dissent in 
Douglas D. speaks specifically to the FBI threat analysis 
protocol, and draws attention to other aspects of Douglas' 
situation, including his prior record of delinquency and the 
testimony of his caseworker, that were not addressed by the 
majority.268 
Like the Wisconsin Supreme Court, other courts do not 
adequately focus on the student's background and 
circumstances. 2r;9 Often, this is because the schools have not 
several other times on the same day regarding the schedule change, and that Sarah 
Lovell in no way acted in a physically threatening manner." Lovell v. Poway Unified 
Sch. Dist., 84 7 F. Supp. 780, 785 (S.D. Cal. 1994). 
266. Two other lower court cases illustrate the same point, focusing primarily on 
the text of the student speech and the response of those around the speaker. Emmett, 
92 F. Supp. 2d 1088; d.S., 757 A.2d 412. The zero- tolerance type cases, like Boman 
snpra n. 114, are even less concerned with the kinds of issues identified by the FBI. 
267. The other criminal cases discussed infra run similarly, with little if any focus 
on the factors defined in the FBI protocol. 
268. In re Oonrtlas D., 626 N.W.2d at 750-751. Jones, 64 S.W.3d 728, RT, 781 S.2d 
1239, In re A.S., 626 N.W.2d, and certainly Milo M., 740 N.E.2d 967, all discussed 
1wpra, are in line with the Donglas majority. 
269. Though some courts do. These are more likely to find for the student, 
especially where that background shows a student with a good record academically and 
with regard to discipline problems. See e.g. Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088. In Emmett, 
Nick Emmett sought and was granted a temporary restraining order, allowing him to 
return to school. Nick was an eighteen-year-old high school senior, Nick Emmett, had 
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done so either. While the more typical judicial inquiries may or 
may not have produced a rational result vis-a-vis precedent, 
they probably do not make for rational decisions regarding true 
threats in the real-world sense of the words. Instead, the 
balance of First Amendment rights against potentially 
threatening speech is somehow skewed away from the kind of 
analysis that would directly benefit school safety. Reflecting on 
the more worldly factors is well within the current judicially 
recognized parameters of contextual considerations, but the 
focus is not present. 
Within this reality, it is preferable for schools and courts to 
look first to whether a threat is actually posed. Here, 
incorporating the FBI standards can lead to more predictable 
results than the typical judicial analysis. Under the objective 
test that many courts prefer, the first question would be 
whether a reasonable person would find the speech in question 
threatening.270 On the surface, certainly, such a question 
would fit both the judicial precedent and the FBI protocol. 
Some of the factors that courts have chosen to consider in this 
analysis include whether the threat was direct, whether the 
threat was communicated to the person threatened, whether 
the person threatened had reason to believe the threat could be 
carried out, and how that person reacted.271 
Assuming this first criterion of whether a reasonable 
person would perceive a threat is met, the courts would 
typically proceed to a contextual analysis. The majority of 
courts tend to look here to the characterization of the threat by 
observers and others. To align with the FBI criteria, this 
a 3.95 grade point average, was co·captain of the basketball team, and had no 
disciplinary incidents in his school records. At home, Nick had created a webpage 
called the "Unofficial Kentlake High Home Page," which included "obituaries" of Nick's 
friends. Finding the obituaries as "written tongue-in-cheek, inspired, apparently, by a 
creative writing class last year in which students were assigned to write their own 
obituary" the court concluded that there was "no evidence" that the obituaries on Nick's 
web were "intended to threaten anyone, did actually threaten anyone, or manifested 
any violent tendencies whatsoever." Nick returned to school. In an out of court 
settlement, the school district paid nominal damages plus $6000 in attorney fees. Id.; 
Hopkins, Kent Student Wins Case Linked to 'Obits' on Web, Officials Mistook Satire for 
a School 'Hit List,' Seattle Post Intelligencer, B3, Mar. 28, 2000. 
270. Wisconsin has this in the basic test. See e.g. In re A.S., 626 N.W.2d 712. See 
also Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725, Lovell, 90 F.3d 367, and D.G., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
12197, all discussed supra in Part 4. 
271. See e.g. Lovell, 90 F.3d 367, D.G., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12197, J.S, 757 A.2d 
412, Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725, all discussed supra in Part 4. 
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information may be considered, but should not be given undue 
weight. In this consideration of context, courts have 
occasionally considered whether the speaker has access to 
weapons, sometimes even finding so by inference. 272 They have 
also considered the speaker's known history regarding violence, 
and perhaps other social or academic facts known to the 
recipient of the threat regarding the speaker.273 In accordance 
with the FBI report's recommendations, this factor should 
move to a priority place among the factors that schools and 
courts should consider in each case. Similarly, schools' and 
courts' attention should also focus on, and give weight to, 
whether the student is suicidal, and/or has suffered significant 
losses. The student's background, both in regard to 
relationships and stability, and their history of drug abuse, 
mental health, violence, bullying, and victimization should be 
considered. Based on the FBI's findings, consideration of these 
factors is more likely to identify situations where a threat is 
actually posed; but such consideration is neither universal nor 
mandated in current jurisprudence. 
Using an augmented true threat analysis that focuses on 
whether a threat is actually posed would also facilitate school 
and judicial analysis of the First Amendment issues. Here 
courts generally use the Tinker analysis, which typically arises 
when the speech is not labeled with the school imprimatur or 
given at official school activities. However, a new approach for 
school disciplinary matters is suggested by an implicit reading 
of La Vine and other cases like Pangle or J.S. This new 
approach would adhere less closely to Tinker, and more closely 
to Fraser and Hazelwood. Fraser, after all, supports a school's 
ability to prohibit lewd and vulgar speech. It seems possible 
that today's courts could easily find a way to similarly 
categorize and prohibit speech that poses a threat.274 Similarly, 
Hazelwood identified categories of speech including speech 
advocating drug use, which schools can legitimately control. 
Again, speech that poses a threat of violence could readily 
become part of this list.275 Obviously, this alternative mode of 
272. See Milo M., 740 N.E. 2d 967. 
27:3. Some courts, like La Vine do consider such factors as the student's personality 
and social and family dynamics. Even LaVine, though, did not focus on the school 
dynamics, the fourth prong of the recommended FBI analysis 
274. See Pangle, 10 P.3d at 287. 
275. Criticizing such an approach the Ninth Circuit dissenters in La Vine, term it a 
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analysis still leaves in question where to draw the line for 
constitutional protection. It also begs, somewhat, the question 
of the distinction, or lack thereof, between on and off-premises 
speech; but, especially in view of the Internet, on and off-
premises speech is far more closely correlated today than 
previously. In any case, whether future student speech 
analysis follows the true threat doctrine as judicially developed 
thus far, or as suggested in this article, or whether it follows 
the Tinker disruption standard, the question of appropriate 
discipline and punishment remains. 
PART 5. CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS 
Threatening student speech occurs in many forms and in 
many contexts, thus calling forth many levels of response from 
school and state officials, as well as from the courts. Not 
surprisingly, schools and courts have addressed threatening 
speech in traditional ways. Students are suspended, 
sometimes expelled, sometimes required to have psychological 
evaluations, 276 or otherwise detained277 before they can return 
to school. Students are also sometimes reported to the criminal 
justice system278 and sometimes prosecuted criminally for 
new "First Amendment rule." LaVine, 279 F. 3d at 724. 
276. E.g. Bloomfield, supra n. 90. See e.g. LaVine, 279 F.3d at 729. See also 
Boman, supra. n. 114, where psychological examination was specifically at issue and 
the court here links the free speech issue to the requirement for such an exam before 
the student can return to school so that if it were not acceptable to restrict the 
student's speech under the First Amendment free speech standard, then not acceptable 
to require psychological evaluation. Others have suggested that there may be grounds 
for psychological evaluation, but not punishment. For further discussion of these 
issues see Easterbrook, supra. n. 115 (discussion of Robby Stango who was forced to 
spend five nights in a psychiatric ward regarding poem, Step to Oblivion). 
277. One often-described example is thirteen-year-old 7th grader Chris Beamon 
who wrote a horror story for a school assignment about being home alone and hearing 
noises. In Chris' story he "acssedently (sic) shot Mrs. Henry," whom he "thought ... 
was a crook so I busted out with a 12 guage (sic) and lsmael busted out with a 9 mm 
and we step (sic) off the porch and this bloody body droped (sic) down in front of us and 
scared us half to death." Chris was arrested the day after he read his story to the class, 
was ordered held for ten days by the juvenile court, and actually spent five days in a 
juvenile facility at which point the charges were dropped. See Matthew B. Stannard, 
Threats in Creative School Work Taken Seriously, San Francisco Chron. A21 (Mar. 9, 
2001); Carlos Illescas, School Threats Now Taken Very Seriously But Some Complain 
Policies Impede Free Speech, Denver Post, B1 (Nov. 22, 1999). 
278. E.g. N.H. Pupil Safety and Violence Prevention Act, N.H. Rev. Stat.§ l9:3-F:l-
F:4 (requiring reporting of bullying behavior). 
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violation of state statutes that prohibit threat making.279 
Where students raise First Amendment claims in response, the 
courts usually turn to either the disruption standard derived 
from Tinker, and thus afford significant protection to student 
speech, (or occasionally the less protective, inappropriate, 
imprimatur standard from Hazelwood), or to the true threat 
standard, which varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and 
offers no First Amendment protection. Given what we have 
recently learned from FBI reports about about how targeted 
violence unfolds in schools, it appears that the current 
approach may be too narrow, or even misdirected. Instead, this 
potentially threatening student speech should be treated like 
other classes of student cases (like free speech or school 
searches)280 where the Constitutional standard, and indeed the 
courts' review of school decisions involving student speech, 
ought to be different for children in schools than it is for adults. 
The Critical Incident Response Group of the FBI's National 
Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime makes the point that 
not all threats can be treated alike: 
In the shock-wave of recent school shootings, this 
reaction may be understandable, but it is exaggerated-
and perhaps dangerous, leading to potential 
underestimate of serious threats, overreaction to less 
serious ones and unfairly punishing or stigmatizing 
students who are in fact not dangerous. A school that 
treats all threats as equal falls into the fallacy 
formulated by Abraham Maslow: "If the only tool you 
have is a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a 
nail."28I 
Under the true threat analysis developed to date, most 
courts may be using only a hammer. Most look to how a 
279. There are also two federal laws that may have some bearing on these 
incidents: The Gun Free Schools Act of 1994 stipulates that receipt of federal funds is 
conditionally based upon the state's adoption of a statute that compels expulsion for a 
specified time period for a student bringing a gun to school along with provisions for 
exception which are available through the case by case review granted to the local 
educational agency. 20 U.S.C. § 8921 (West 1999). The Safe Schools Act of 1994 was 
developed and implemented to assist schools in achieving Goal Six of the National 
Education Goals relating to eliminating drugs and violence in schools and strives to 
create a safe and violence free learning environment. 20 U.S.C. §§ 5961-5968 (West 
1999). 
280. See Tinker, a93 U.S. 503; T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325. 
28 I. O'Toole, supra n. 1, at 5-6; see also Vossekuil et aL, supra n. 3 at 3H; 
Easterbrook, supra n. 115. 
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reasonable person perceives the speech-in other words, 
whether a reasonable person would foresee that the recipient 
would perceive the speech to be interpreted as threatening, or 
whether the recipient so perceived it. 282 Most courts also look 
to the perception of the listener, either as a major requisite 
factor, or as part of the surrounding circumstances that it 
considers.283 To increase the likelihood of considering the 
specific and unique facts of every case, a wide interpretation of 
the surrounding circumstances or context factors is called for. 
Such an interpretation would not start with stereotypes such 
as "blanket characterizations, or student 'profiles"' that do not 
provide a reliable basis for making judgments about a threat 
posed by a particular student. 284 Even worse, the use of 
profiles can shift attention away from more reliable facts and 
evidence about a student's actual behavior, history, and 
communications. 285 
In addition to rejecting stereotypes, the revised approach 
would be broad enough to encompass the threat assessment 
factors, but certainly would not so mandate. A balancing test 
gauged for schools and their safety would look something like 
this: 
• Threat assessment procedure in place capable of 
addressing student, family dynamics, sehool 
dynamies, and social dynamics. 286 
282. E.g. In reA.S., 626 N.W.2d 712;ln re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725. 
283. For example, see e.g. In re McCoy, 742 N.E.2d 217; Milo M, 740 N.E. 2d 967; 
RT, 781 S.2d 1239; Jones, 64 S.W.3d at 734. 
284. Fein eta!., supra n. 17, at 32. 
285. O'Toole, supra n. 1, at 38-39. Some popular misconceptions are debunked by 
the known data, and school officials charged with assessing threats should not be taken 
in by what may have been the stereotypical view. For example, the age range of the 
school killers is eleven to twenty-one with most between thirteen and eighteen; 76 
percent were white; 63 percent from two-parent families, only 5 percent with foster 
parents; 41 percent were doing well at school, and only 5 percent failing; 41 percent 
socialized with "mainstream students or were considered mainstream students," 
though 34 percent were characterized as loners or described themselves as loners; 44 
percent were involved in extracurricular activities; 63 percent had no discipline record, 
27 percent had never been suspended, only 10 percent had ever been expelled, 73 
percent showed no change in school behavior prior to the attack and a few showed 
improved academic and behavioral performance before the attack. Vossekuil et a!., 
supra n. 3, at 23-24. 
286. O'Toole, supra n. 1, at 10-14; see also Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725. (Prosser 
concurring). See also Dorn & Doss supra n. 251, at 27 (multidisciplinary threat 
assessment team); Michael S. Dorn, Developing School Safety Plans 8-11 (LRP Pub. 
2002) (School Safety Task Force). 
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• What was said? 
• Did the speaker intend it to be threatening? 
• Would a reasonable person have thought it would 
be interpreted as threatening? 
• What is known about the speaker, in particular: 
o Is there evidence that the speaker has 
contemplated suicide? 
o Is there evidence that the speaker is 
under particular stress? 
o Is there evidence that the speaker has a 
trusting relationship with an adult(s)? 
• What sources of information are available? 
o Trusting adult, preferred; 
o Student's history, family history; 
o Others exposed to student, but be mindful 
of unreliable characterizations. 
• What is the appropriate response? 
o Further analysis, conversations or work 
with those close to student; 
o Further analysis, conversations or work 
with student; 
o Suspension 
evaluation; 
o Alternative 
suspenswn; 
pending psychological 
programmmg during 
o Other suspensiOn for disciplinary 
purposes; 
o Other proactive intervention during 
suspenswn; or 
o Expulsion. 
723 
Use of such an analysis in schools could be accomplished 
through judicial opinion, just as the special circumstances in 
schools have justified a different search standard or a different 
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speech standard for students. Reference to, and incorporation 
of, such a real world oriented analysis would, like the Fourth 
Amendment student search cases, make the schools safer by 
focusing more attention on the unique circumstances that exist 
in each case, and might also result in schools paying more 
proactive attention to the students who most need their help. 
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APPENDIX 1: THE SPEECH 
Fraser's Speech287 
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm 
in his shirt, his character is firm-but most ... of all, his belief 
in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. 
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it 
in. If necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He 
doesn't attack things in spurts-he drives hard, pushing and 
pushing until finally-he succeeds. 
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even the climax, 
for each and every one of you. 
So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president-he'll never come 
between you and the best our high school can be. 
Last Words288 
As each day passed, 
I watched, love sprout, from the most, 
unlikely places, 
which reminds, me that, 
beauty is in the eye's, of the beholder. 
As I remember, 
I start to cry, 
for I, 
had learned, 
this to late, 
and now, 
I must spend, 
each day, 
alone, 
287. Bethel, 478 U.S. at 687. 
288. La Vine, 257 F.3d at 983-984. 
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alone for supper, 
alone at night, 
alone at death. 
Death I feel, 
crawlling down 
my neck at, 
every turn, 
and so, 
now I know, 
what I must do. 
I pulled my gun, 
from its case, 
and began to load it. 
I remember, 
thinking at least I won't, 
go alone, 
as I, jumped in, 
the car, 
all I could think about, 
was I would not, 
go alone. 
As I walked, 
through the, 
now empty halls, 
I could feel, my hart pounding. 
As I approched, 
the classroom door, 
I drew my gun and, 
[2003 
663] THREATS MADE, THREATS POSED 
threw open the door, 
Bang, Bang, Bang-Bang. 
When it all was over, 
28 were, 
dead, 
and all I remember, 
was not felling, 
any remorce, 
for I felt, 
I was, 
clensing my soul, 
I quickly, 
turned and ran, 
as the bell rang, 
all I could here, 
were screams, 
screams of friends, 
screams of co workers, 
and just plain, 
screams of shear horor, 
as the students, found their, 
slayen classmates, 
2 years have passed, and 
now I lay, 
29 roses, 
down upon, 
these stairs, 
as now, 
727 
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I feel, 
I may, 
strike again. 
No tears, 
shall be shead, 
1n sarrow, 
for I am, 
alone, 
and now, 
I hope, 
I can feel, 
remorse, 
for what I did, 
without a shed, 
of tears, 
for no tear, 
shall fall, 
from your face, 
but from mine, 
as I try, 
to rest in peace, 
Bang! 
[2003 
663J THREATS MADE, THREATS POSED 729 
Outsidef289 
"These are the top ten things I would like to see happen at 
school ... to the people who 'run' it, or just some things to 
cause them Stryfe. 
"What is wrong with school you may ask . . . ? I can't 
imagine too many people don't have their own individual 
responses to this question, but perhaps you would like to hear 
mine? Schools are a breeding ground for hatred and 
segregation. Students are persecuted by their peers, judged by 
their appearances and treated differently because of them. 
Cliques dominate their surroundings, and torment those who 
don't fit in . . . The teachers preach nothing more than 
conforming to the 'norm' and obeying authority when we reach 
the 'REAL WORLD', slowly destroying each young mind which 
enters the public school system .... 
The top ten list included: 
" ... 8) Feed snakebite antidote or Visine to someone. The 
former will make a person vomit. (Make sure it is a harmless 
type ... most are.) The Visine will send them to the bathroom 
almost instantly. It is one of the world's greatest laxatives 
... "7) Deposit some very disgusting smelling liquid in the 
school commons. Some possible sources? 
Dog training liquid: smells like concentrated piss 
Cadaver scent: used for Search and Rescue, it is the smell of 
a dead human body. Call a chemical company (Need some 
company names? Just write us! We will get you some!) and tell 
them you are training a dog for search and rescue ... it is a 
great smell ... 
Hydrogen Sulfide: what most stink bombs are composed of. 
The chemistry room has an abundance of this I am told ... 
"6) A collection of teacher's signatures. They are not hard to 
obtain ... teachers are usually pretty free with them. Progress 
reports, hall passes, anywhere. If a substantial list of them 
were established, it would be great to post around school! 
"5) Epoxy glue any lock you can come to, aside from lockers. 
It will cause a lot of Kaos among the teachers. 
"4) Blowing things up is always a great form of release ... 
as long as people aren't endangered, life is good! How about 
toilets? Put calcium Carbide (sold as 'Gopher-Go' m some 
289. Pangle, 10 J'.:Jd at 281-282. 
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places) in a gelatin capsule (available at any drug store ... dir 
cheap) and flush it. It causes a violent explosion when it hits 
water and some damage if it is flushed. Some other forms of 
exciting flushables? Firecrackers, balloons partly filled with 
air ... be creative! Express yourself! 
"3) Bomb threats are great, aren't they? We get to leave 
early, and if it is after 2:00 we don't have to make the day up at 
the end of the year. Anyway, if you attempt to call in a bomb 
threat, be careful. I am told it is a federal offense ... not to 
scare anyone off. It would be great to have some more! 
However, don't be an IDIOT and tell everyone what it is you 
have done. Don't do it for the recognition, do it because you 
believe in the cause. 
"2) How do you like the schools use of theh intercom 
system? Would you like to adapt it to your own private 
intercom show? That would be nice! And definitely possible! 
Splicing communication wires isn't hard at all! All you need is 
alligator clips, wire, a stereo with a pre-recorded tape and a 
remote location to splice in at. Above the panels of the ceiling, 
you can find the wire to the P A system. 
"1) PORN ADDS! We have all the phone numbers and 
addresses of the teachers in the Bend/LaPine school district at 
our disposal! Using them, it would be nice to place them in a 
wonderful homosexual personal add! ... or even replying to one 
wit their name and number! If you would like any teachers 
number or address, please write us and we will get it to you! 
Killing Mrs. {Teacher)29° 
I hate this class it is hell 
Every day I can't wait for the bell, 
I bitch and whine until it is time, 
For me to get in the hall. 
Back in the day, 
I would sit and pray 
to see if I may 
Run away (from this hell) 
290. D. G., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12197 at a. 
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Now as the days get longer 
My yearning gets stronger 
To kill the bitcher. 
One day when I get out of jail 
Cuz my friends paid my bail. 
And people will ask why. 
I'll say because the Bitch had to die! 
By [Student] 
Jones Rap291 
731 
I hope you remember this day, cuz you'll forever be the 
cause of my violence and rage, 
You steadily rejected me, now I'm angry and full of fucking 
m1sery, 
You try to be judgmental telling me to act right. Before you 
take the speck from my eye, take the fucking board from your 
eye, 
I didn't do nothing to deserve this, and now I'm stressed, 
and when I'm stressed, I'm at my best, 
I'm a motherfuckin murderer, I slit my mom's throat and 
killed my sister. You gonna keep being a bitch, and I'm gonna 
cliche [click], 
My hatred and aggression will go towards you, you better 
run bitch, cuz I can't control what I do. I'll murder you before 
you can think twice, cut you up and use you for decoration to 
look nice, 
I've had it up to here bitch, there's gonna be a 187 on your 
whole family trik [trick], 
Then you'll be just like me, with no home, no friends, no 
money, 
You'll be deprived of life itself, you won't be able to live with 
yourself, 
Then you'll be six feet under, beside your sister, father, and 
mother, 
You'll be in hell, and I'll be in Jail, but I won't give a fuck 
cuz we all know I've been there before, 
291. ,Jones, 64 S.W.ad at 730. 
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Goodbye forever my good friend. I'll see you on judgement 
day when I'm punished for my sin" 
Milo M's Drawings29Z 
292. Milo M., 740 N.E.2d 967. 
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Who Killed My Dog293 
Please tell me who killed my dog. I miss him very much. He 
was my best friend. I do miss him terribly. D1d you do it? Did 
you kill my dog? Do you know who did it? You do know, don't 
you? I know you know who did it. You know who killed my dog. 
I'll kill you if you don't tell me who killed my dog. Tell me who 
did it. Tell me. Tell me. Tell me. Please tell me now. How could 
anyone kill a dog. My dog was the best. Man's best friend. Who 
could shoot their best friend? Who? Dammit, Who? Who killed 
my dog? Who killed him? Who killed my dog? I'll kill you all! 
You all killed my dog. You all hated him. Who? Who are you 
that you could kill my best friend? Who killed my dog? 
293. Boman, 2000 WL 297167 at 1. Artwork was excerpted from the ACLU site, 
ACLU Vows Legal Action, snpra n. 114. 
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APPENDIX 2: FURTHER ONLINE RESOURCES TO PURSUE THESE 
TOPICS 
General Resources 
United States Department of Education 
http://www .ed.gov/ 
National School Safety Center 
This site provides statistical information and links to other 
sites and organizations. 
http://www .nsscl.org 
National Center for Educational Statistics 
This site provides useful resources and information relative to 
educational research and improvement initiatives. 
http://www .nces.ed.gov 
Education Week Online 
Education Week is a resource that covers education news. 
Their online edition provides up-to-date information regarding 
education cases and other important news. 
http://www .edweek.org/ 
Piper Resources 
This site is home to a comprehensive listing of state and local 
laws, federal and state government information, and useful 
links to other resources. 
http://www.piperinfo.com/state/index.cfm 
National Association of Secondary School Principals. 
NASSP's New Searchable Publications Archive 
This online resource-a searchable publications archive-is 
home to every issue of Principal Leadership and NASSP 
Bulletin dating back to 1995. 
http://www .nassp.org/ 
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National Association of Elementary School Principals 
The online center for educational research in areas pertinent to 
school leadership today. 
http://www .naesp.org 
NEAToday Online 
The online center for topics in education from the National 
Education Association. 
http://www .nea.org/neatoday/ 
Violence Prevention 
United States Secret Service and United States 
Department of Education, Final Report and Findings: 
Implications for Prevention of School Attacks in the United 
States (May 2002). 
http://www .ustreas.gov/usss/ntac/ ssi_final_ report. pdf. 
United States Secret Service and United States 
Department of Education, Threat Assessment in Schools~ A 
Guide to Managing Threatening Situations and to Creating 
Safe School Climates (May 2002). 
http://www .ustreas.gov/usss/ntac/ssi_guide.pdf. 
United States Secret Service, An Interim Report on the 
Prevention of Targeted Violence in Schools Evaluating Risk for 
Targeted Violence in Schools (2000). 
http :1 /www. secretservice. gov/n tac/n tac_ssi_report. pdf 
Critical Incident Response Group & National Center for 
the Analysis ofViolent Crime, Mary O'Toole, FBI, The 
School Shooter: A Threat Assessment Perspective 
http://www .fbi.gov/pu blications/schoollschool2. pdf 
Violence and Safety, Education Week, June 19, 2002. 
http://www .ed week.org/context/topics/issuespage.cfm?id 
=39 
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Other Resources 
Foundation for Individual Rights in Education 
FIRE, is a nonprofit educational foundation devoted to free 
speech, individual liberty, religious freedom, the rights of 
conscience, legal equality, due process, and academic 
freedom on our nation's campuses. 
http://www. thefire.org/issues/cuO 10901. ph p3 
Freedom Forum 
The Freedom Forum provides current news and 
perspectives with respect to the First Amendment including 
free speech, free press and free religion. 
http://www .freedomforum.org/ 
Northwest Education Collaboration: Research 
A network and resource center for family, school, community 
partnerships to improve family and child outcomes. 
http://www.nwrel.org/cfc/frc/resrch4.html 
Free Speech: Hate Speech 
The very best in links about free speech, hate speech and 
speech codes. 
http://www.civilliberty.tqn.com/cs/hatespeech 
Rights Watch: Taking Threats Seriously 
In the wake of recent school shootings, police and school 
officials are cracking down on students threatening violence. 
http://www .nea.org/neatoday/9809/rights.html 
National Threat Assessment Center 
Secret Service Safe School Initiative 
http://www .secretservice.gov/ntac_ssi.shtml 
Bullying Among 9th Graders: An Exploratory Study 
Sandy Harris, Garth Petrie, and William Willoughby, 86 Natl. 
Assn. of Secondary Sch. Principals Bulletin (Mar. 2002) 
http://www.principals.org/news/bltn_9thbully0302.html 
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Every Child Learning: Safe and Supportive Schools 
Gerald N. Tirozzi, Executive Director, NASSP, Vincent L. 
Ferrandino, Executive Director, NAESP. 
[2003 
http://www .principals.org/publicaffairs/views/every _chid 
_lrnng.htm 
Experts Ponder Sept. 11 Effect On School Violence 
Darcia Harris Bowman, June 19, 2002. 
http://www.edweek.org/ew/newstory.cfm?slug=41shoot.h 
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